Daily Report

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Officials Meet With Clinton, Comment on Plan

Slovak Envoy: 'Acceptable Alternative'

LD1101141994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Immediately before the meeting between the Visegrad four presidents and U.S. President Clinton, Slovak President Michal Kovac said that if Visegrad Group countries are not sufficiently mature to enter NATO, they could at least join NATO's political structures. Based on this, we asked Ivan Mjartan, Slovak ambassador to the Czech Republic, whether this attitude was still valid after the adoption of the U.S.-sponsored Partnership for Peace plan by NATO yesterday.

[Begin Mjartan recording] [passage omitted] President Kovac wished to indicate that he could see another, more dynamic way of incorporating the Visegrad Four countries into NATO. His idea is based on the fact that incorporating into NATO's political structures will immediately create certain security guarantees and will provide guarantees in the process of creating another sphere of security and cooperation in Europe, in particular in eastern Europe.

The NATO summit unanimously approved the U.S.-sponsored Partnership for Peace proposal yesterday. We emphasized on several occasions—not only in speeches by the president and the prime minister, and in speeches by our other representatives—that the Partnership for Peace is an acceptable alternative at this stage for us. We regard it as an intermediate stage which will be followed—as we expect—by the adoption of a specific timetable for a further course of action by both the United States and NATO. The outcome of this should be the final and full-fledged membership of these countries in NATO.

Given this situation, the Partnership for Peace is in fact the only and acceptable alternative for us. [end recording]

Clinton-Havel News Conference 11 Jan

LD1101192694 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1750 GMT 11 Jan 94

[News conference by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Czech President Vaclav Havel with an unidentified moderator at Prague Castle—live]

[Text] [Moderator] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. U.S. President Bill Clinton and Czech President Vaclav Havel have just finished their talks, which lasted 45 minutes. They are prepared to make short statements and after that they will answer two questions. I would like to ask President Havel to make his statement.

[Havel] I would like to say that the Czech Republic is extremely honored by the visit of the U.S. President as well as by the fact that Prague was chosen as the location of the meeting with the representatives of neighboring countries.

During the talks we had either as delegations or individually, we made it clear that the Czech Republic welcomes the Partnership for Peace project and is ready to immediately start giving this project a concrete content. The Czech Republic considers this project to be well-balanced and good.

At the same time, we expressed our will to cooperate with our neighbors. We noted the similarity of our stances with our neighbors, and we stressed that we also attach great importance to regional cooperation.

We discussed several other topics, including economic cooperation. On behalf of the Czech side this is all for the time being.

[Clinton, in English with simultaneous Czech translation] First I want to express my thanks to President Havel for his warm welcome. I am paying only my second visit to Prague. I was here 24 years ago in the same week but in a totally different role. The progress that Prague and the Czech Republic have made has made a great impression on me. Likewise, my conversions and meetings with your president, prime minister, and other representatives have also made a great impression on me.

I confirmed that the security of this republic and other members of Central and Eastern Europe is very significant for the security of the United States and European countries as well as of the Atlantic alliance. The Partnership for Peace is the beginning of a genuine security relationship which could lead to full membership in NATO.

Of course, we must also think about the economic dimension of security. Without this, it would be difficult to achieve good policy and develop genuinely democratic relations in the name of the success of nations in all Partnership countries and the development of society. We have been talking about these things; further talks await us tomorrow, when we will talk, perhaps in more specific terms, about how to attain these aims. In any case, I thank President Havel for his support for Partnership for Peace.

[Moderator] Your questions, please. Czech Television, [name indistinct].

[Question] I am [name indistinct] from Czech Television. Gentlemen, do you think any East European country could join NATO ahead of the rest?

[Havel] We interpret Partnership for Peace as a door open to all, but, of course, a lot will depend on each individual just how soon he passes through that door. This projects wants to deal with each country individually.

[Clinton] This issue has not been resolved. [Passage indistinct] As regards Partnership for Peace, one has to emphasize that with immediate effect it will provide for joint exercises, joint preparation of the armed forces, and joint solutions to a number of issues which could lead to full membership.

[Moderator] [Word indistinct], please.

[Question] [passage indistinct]

[Interpreter] Apologies from the interpreter. I can't hear the question.

[Havel] Developments in the Russian Federation have been complex, dramatic, and painful and we are naturally following them most attentively. But we firmly believe that in the Russian Federation too, democracy and the market economy will gradually prevail, despite all the complex stages and episodes of this development.

[Moderator] The presidents have a further program ahead of them. Thank you for your questions and your attention. Good bye.

Olechowski Notes 'Doubts'

LD1101233894 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2300 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] I still have not dispelled all my doubts concerning the conviction that the Partnership for Peace leads to NATO membership, Andrzej Olechowski, head of the Polish diplomatic delegation, has said in Prague. In Olechowski's view, all the decisions made at the Brussels' summit were, after all, beneficial for Poland. In his opinion the Partnership for Peace raises the security level in such a sense that it brings us closer to NATO. Among other things, we will have access to the procedures and military technology of the pact. In time, we gradually will be getting access to early warning systems and the exchange of intelligence available to the pact, Olechowski said.

However, because of the fact that no timetable was defined for Poland joining western structures, Olechowski said that he considered it to be a Polish failure connected with the NATO summit in Brussels.

Czech Minister Cites 'Open Issues'

LD1201113094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Our correspondent Eva Hulkova brings topical information about the proceedings at Prague Castle.

[Hulkova] Intensive working meetings are under way at Prague Castle. At the moment President Vaclav Havel is in talks with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. President Havel has already had talks with [Slovak President] Michal Kovac and [Polish President] Lech Walesa. The foreign ministers' talks were being held at the same time. Of course, the Partnership for Peace is the center of attention.

Responding to the question by Czech Radio as to whether any issues remain open, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said that there are a number of open issues since the Partnership for Peace is a program that, by its nature, is an open one. I hope that this is the space that we will fill in by our activity and that this activity—not only ours but also the activity of the 16 NATO countries—will result in our soon becoming a component part of NATO that brings together countries with whom we are close by our civilization, history, and values, said the Czech foreign minister for Czech Radio.

[Polish Foreign Minister] Andrzej Olechowski said that the Polish side considered the Partnership for Peace to be a very important contribution to European security, and that he perceived the project as innovative, constructive, and optimistic.

Ministers Continue Bilateral Talks

LD1201113694 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Bilateral talks between Visegrad Four prime ministers continue in Hrzan Palace in Prague. Our editor Jana Zemanova is at Hrzan Palace.

[Zemanova] The meeting behind closed doors between the Czech and Slovak Prime Ministers Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar is drawing to an end in Hrzan Palace. It is a part of today's series of bilateral talks on security and further cooperation between Visegrad countries at prime ministerial level.

During the previous meeting between Czech Prime Minister Klaus and his Polish counterpart Waldemar Pawlak, the two politicians explained to each other a certain tension which was generated by Prague's individualist attitude to the acceptance of the U.S. Partnership for Peace plan. This is how Klaus described this situation:

[Begin Klaus recording] I think that relations are not as tense as it would appear from some media headlines. We have a whole number of projects we would like to execute together. These projects should be directed at practical forms of Czech-Polish contacts and cooperation. I think that our views on this point were completely identical. [end recording]

[Zemanova] What is important is that the two prime ministers jointly emphasized the willingness to continue to cooperate and to meet for further talks as soon as possible. According to Pawlak, economic cooperation will have priority in future relations between the Czech Republic and Poland. After all, this can be documented by the presence at the talks of Czech Economics Minister Karel Dyba.

Olechowski on 'Innovative' Plan

LD1201125094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Let us go back to Prague Castle once again. Czech radio correspondent Eva Hulkova has recorded several statements there. [passage omitted]

The next speaker to come to the Czech radio microphone was Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski.

[Begin Olechowski recording, in English fading into Czech translation] What we are saying is that we regard the Partnership for Peace as a very important contribution to European security. We think it is an innovative, constructive, and optimistic program. As we have often been saying, our problem with this program is that, although it is a step in the right direction, it is a very small step, because this program does not provide a clear prospect for our NATO membership. We have noticed, unfortunately, that in all the Western institutions in which we are seeking membership, there are various stages of preparation for our membership. No promise has been given to us that we will actually get this membership. This is where the essence of Polish criticism lies. [end recording] [passage omitted]

U.S.-Hungary Talks Summarized

LD1201121294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Bill Clinton's series of talks with the Visegrad country presidents and prime ministers has begun in Prague. First the U.S. President met the Hungarian leaders. Our Prague correspondent Peter Nyaradi reports.

[Nyaradi] The Hungarian delegation arrived at the Prague residence of the U.S. ambassador, where the Hungarian-U.S. summit meeting took place, shortly before 0900. Beside President Clinton sat [Hungarian President] Arpad Goncz. The negotiating delegations, led by [Prime Minister] Peter Boross and [Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky , U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and [John] Shalikashvili, U.S. chief of staff, were seated opposite one another.

Following the talks, which lasted nearly 45 minutes, Foreign Affairs Spokesman Janos Herman evaluated the meeting as follows:

[Begin Herman recording] Due to the venue and the time, the central topic of the discussion, naturally, was the region's security policy situation. President Clinton confirmed that the United States followed our region with great attention, and the security of the region was both in the United States and NATO's interest. It is an important interest of the United States to guarantee this security.

The Partnership for Peace proposal was mentioned. The Hungarian delegation told President Clinton that Hungary welcomed this proposal; it can see the advantages of the idea. Hungary is ready to actively participate in the Partnership for Peace process.

President Clinton praised the Hungarian attitude. He stressed he felt Hungary had understood U.S. intentions, the essence of the initiative. [end recording]

[Nyaradi] Janos Herman also said that mostly President Clinton had spoken during the discussion, more than half of which was devoted to security policy issues. It was also mentioned that the United States was ready to help the region's—and within that Hungary's—economic development, and they were ready to examine what they could do about it.

The two delegations also discussed the events of the Yugoslav crisis. In the course of this discussion, the Hungarian delegation was able to provide valuable information, since we are a neighboring country.

The Russian domestic political situation and its possible international effects were also briefly raised. President Clinton emphasized that the United States was not naive and will not allow itself to be pressurized either, but the Russian's views had to be considered.

At the end of the talks, which took place in friendly atmosphere, Hungary was also on the agenda. Janos Herman said the following about it:

[Begin Herman recording] The U.S. side stressed that the stability of democracy in Hungary was highly appreciated by them. The smooth and quick election of the new prime minister was considered as a proof of this. [end recording]

[Nyaradi] The Hungarian delegation has split for the rest of their program. Arpad Goncz and Geza Jeszenszky held approximately 30-minute talks with their Czech counterparts President Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in Prague Castle. During this time, Prime Minister Peter Boross first visited the financial institution Interbanka, which has gone into majority Hungarian ownership, at Wenceslas Square, then he met his Czech counterpart Vaclav Klaus.

At the moment, all the foreign guests are having lunch with U.S. President Clinton and the members of the U.S. delegation at the ambassador's residency. Brief statements can be expected after the ceremonial lunch.

Official on Walesa-Clinton Meeting

LD1201122094 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Wladyslaw Klaczynski, director of the Press and Information Department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, speaks on the meeting between President Lech Walesa and Bill Clinton:

[Begin Klaczynski recording] The meeting between the two presidents took place in a very matter-of-fact and calm [spokojna] atmosphere. President Walesa said that Poland did not intend to block the [Partnership for

Peace] initiative, but he pointed out all the doubts connected with it, the doubts arising from the historical experience of our country, and the doubts arising from the assessment of the situation.

Anyway, President Walesa emphasized the wish, if not to say a determined wish, for the process of our country's integration with European structures, involving equally the areas of security, politics, and economics, to take place efficiently and as speedily as possible. He emphasized that this aspiration is not aimed at cutting Russia off and that this aspiration was not aimed against Russia and Russia's interests.

Another important element was a statement by Prime Minister Pawlak who spoke about economic relations between Poland and Europe, and between Poland and the United States.

President Walesa emphasized on many occasions the need for more activity on the part of Western Europe in the integration processes. I would like to stress here what President Clinton pointed out a few times. He said that he regarded the Partnership for Peace as an opening of the door and not the creation of obstacles. [end recording]

NATO To Consider Bosnian Membership

AU1101203594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner replied to the letter he received from Irfan Ljubijankic, foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 23 December 1993 concerning our initiative for Bosnia-Herzegovina's participation in the Partnership for Peace. The letter stresses that Bosnia-Herzegovina's application will be considered and that all NATO members have been informed about this initiative.

Partnership for Peace does not represent formal membership in NATO. It implies mutual obligations of NATO member states and those countries whose foreign and defense policies have the same aims as those of NATO member states. This idea was initiated by U.S. President Bill Clinton and, in the initial stage, it referred to some Central European countries that have already met the conditions for participation in Partnership for Peace. In his letter to Ljubijankic, Woerner expressed the belief that this year will bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This was stated in a communique issued by the Foreign Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

'Failure' of NATO Air Strike Proposal Viewed

LD1101162594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1605 GMT 11 Jan 94

["Pool" item—by Stevan Cordas]

[Text] Belgrade, January 11 (TANJUG)—The failure of the French-British proposal presented at the NATO summit in Brussels for threatening the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes if they refuse to allow the use of the Tuzla airport and lift the blockade of the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica was a logical and expected outcome of the meeting, diplomatic sources in Belgrade assessed in first unofficial reactions on Tuesday.

This opinion is based on NATO's old stand that only a political solution is possible in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was again stressed at the two-day summit.

This is precisely why NATO is using threats and pressure to stimulate the three warring sides in Bosnia to lay down arms and find political solutions to their conflicts.

The harsh threats made by NATO officials prior to the Brussels summit were calculated to step up pressure in expectation of a new round of peace talks on Bosnia, due to open in Geneva on January 18, and before the talks between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic in Bonn last Sunday and Monday, the sources said.

The strongest threats were again addressed to the Bosnian Serb side while the Croats were threatened with sanctions and the Moslems with a withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeepers from Bosnia.

The Brussels summit has shown that the Bosnian conflict is indeed giving NATO a headache but that it is by no means its main preoccupation.

No doubt, the organization finds the questions of Russia, NATO's survival and other issues relating to its operation more vital than the problem of Bosnia.

Tudjman Comments on Results of Bonn Talks

LD1101151494 Berlin N-TV in German 1325 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by Beate Mueller-Blattau in Bonn; date not given; questions are in English; Tudjman answers in Serbo-Croatian, with superimposed translation into German—live or recorded]

[Text] [Mueller-Blattau] Mr. President, the result of the peace negotiations is very unsatisfactory. Why was there no better outcome?

[Tudjman] One could agree with your assessment that the result is unsatisfactory and one could also assume that the Croatian delegation is not satisfied with the results. But I think that the meeting was in a certain sense a success because it helped clarify many important questions, and in any case it is important for people to know that Croatian policy is consistent, not only with regard to an end to hostilities but also with regard to all efforts at cooperation and friendship between Muslims and Croats.

[Mueller-Blattau] Mr. President, with all due respect, the whole world is hoping for peace because we all assume there will soon be no more money and no more arms left. Where are you getting the weapons?

[Tudjman] The Muslim side has of course some weapons and munitions factories, and one has to say that they have gained a certain advantage by having used humanitarian convoys in order to import high-tech war material. In all wars in the world, there are always some opportunities to gain access to weapons. Over and above this, the Serb side is selling arms at very high prices to every party involved in the war. And they have quite certainly considerable quantities.

[Mueller-Blattau] Mr. President, you could probably call me very naive if I ask why the Bosnians and the Croats don't join forces and fight together against the main aggressor, the Serbs.

[Tudjman] At the beginning, the Croats and the Muslims not only made common cause, but the Croats in Bosnia and in Herzegovina defended Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Serb aggressor with the aid of the Republic of Croatia, at a time when the Muslims were not able to do this. If that had not been the case, then the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have fallen into the hands of the Serb aggressor. Later, however, the understanding between the Croats and Muslims broke down because at that time, the Serbs had conquered two-thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslims, knowing that they could not retake the country, turned against the Croats. That is the set of problems. Even the talks yesterday and the day before were concerned with this particular set of problems. And that is probably why no agreement was reached—to be precise, particularly because there is the Muslim demand that they should take over the regions inhabited by Croats.

[Mueller-Blattau] There is a rumor, Mr. President, that you met Milosevic even before the war, in 1991, to talk even then about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that correct, Mr. President?

[Tudjman] Yes, that's right. I did actually meet Mr. Milosevic. Following the meeting, I also suggested that Milosevic and I should meet Izetbegovic as well, for these are the three most important people in relation to the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We met in Split. The main topic was at that time the prevention of a possible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And in Split we held the same views and positions which we put forward right at the start on the Petersberg.

Izetbegovic Cited on Bonn Talks With Croats

LD1001224294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] A two-day meeting between state delegations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia ended in Bonn today. In this connection, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, made the following statement for Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and television:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I am on the line from Bonn, where talks between us and the Croatian delegation ended an hour ago. I must say that the talks were organized by the German Government and that they took place with the help from German Foreign Minister Mr. Kinkel and Cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg. These talks took place last night and they lasted for several hours until midnight last night, because we arrived late yesterday afternoon, and all day today. They lasted for more than 10 hours with interruptions.

Nothing special has been achieved. We did not expect much from these talks anyhow. As far as we are concerned, we drew their attention to three important issues: the situation in central Bosnia, Mostar, and access to the sea.

Regarding central Bosnia, we took the line that military disengagement ought to be carried out by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] withdrawing from Vitez and Busovaca. In return, our army would not enter these towns; they would be entered by a mixed police force. However, the Croatian side unfortunately rejected this proposal.

Regarding Mostar, we insisted on a solution that has already been put forward, that Mostar be administered by the European Union for two years after the agreement is signed. In that period, the main job for the European Union would be to return home all Mostar citizens. This period would be under the slogan "Mostar to the Citizens of Mostar"; that is, all citizens of Mostar who have been evicted would return. Their number is huge—tens of thousands of people have been evicted, several thousand families have been evicted from Mostar. They would return. Now they are scattered; some are in Croatia, some in Bosnia, and a huge majority of them are now in Germany and in Nordic countries. Our aim is that these people should return to Mostar. I would like to stress that we cannot accept any definition which says that Mostar is only a Croat town. We cannot accept it. Mostar is a Muslim town. It is a common town. We will insist on that.

Regarding access to the sea, there has been no progress. The Croatian side is toughest here. Now they have come up with a new proposal: to cede for 50 or more years a part of the coast at the Peljesac peninsula. This actually means leasing it for 50 or more years. This refers to a part of the coast on which we could build up a port. We took that proposal into consideration, but of course we did not give any answer.

We also initiated another series of current questions, primarily the release of all prisoners. According to our information, we are talking about another several thousand of our people. The Croatian side claims the figure is not as high, but it is not denying that a certain number of

our prisoners—which it has promised to release soon—are still in prisons, like those at Heliodrom near Mostar, Dretelj, and Ljubusko.

We also insisted on having a hospital sent to us, a large field hospital in the east side of Mostar, which is currently in the port Ploce and has been there for a long time. It was said that this issue has been resolved and that it is now up to the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] to transport the hospital, and that there are no further obstacles. [sentence as heard]

The helicopters are unfortunately still in [Croat-held] Medjugorje, I mean our two helicopters which arrived there to pick up the wounded. According to the Croatian side, the problem there is that we have not released 71 Croat prisoners who were on the list. We will have to examine this issue again.

I must say that the Croat delegation surprised us with one of their proposals. We were taken by surprise by it. It is a draft agreement on comprehensive cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. They are offering a creation sometime in the future of a common market, a customs union, and even a monetary union between the two states. They also proposed that we have free access to the sea, that there should practically be no borders between the two states, and so forth.

This is an interesting proposal which, I must say, was made at an inopportune time. Of course, we did not reject such a proposal. We did not accept it either. We did not have the mandate to discuss it. I told them this, but said that we will examine the proposal seriously, to see all its implications on Bosnia-Herzegovina, to see what it contains, and what the political, economic, and other consequences would be. Among other things, the creation of a so-called common market was envisaged. This was an interesting proposal that took us a bit by surprise.

I must emphasize that these talks were talks between the two state delegations. In our state delegation I had with me Foreign Minister Ljubijankic and Mr. Komsic. On their side, apart from Tudjman and Dr. Granic, their deputy prime minister and foreign minister were representatives of the Bosnian Croats.

This was, in the main, the outcome of the talks which ended this evening. [end recording]

Tudjman Document Described as 'Tactical' Move

AU1101140894 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1210 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Telephone interview with reporter Volker Wagner in Bonn by Karin Beindorf in Cologne—live]

[Text] [Beindorf] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his Foreign Minister Mate Granic gave a news conference at the Croatian embassy in Bonn two hours ago. Mr. Wagner, Tudjman described the Petersberg talks as useful yesterday. Has it become clear what he meant by that?

[Wagner] No. One cannot really say that things have become clearer. Quite the contrary. This news conference has confirmed an old truth—that the more interesting pieces of news become usually known before, after, or on the sidelines of news conferences. One such news item that has leaked from the surroundings of the delegation is that the 16-page confederation document with 16 articles, presented by President Tudjman, was primarily a tactical paper, a tactical paper designed to tell the world: Look, the Muslims are not pursuing any consistent policy at all in Bosnia. They are simply interested in conquering territory in central Bosnia at the expense of the Croats. Look, we Croats are developing ideas about the political future, as to how Muslims and Croats might live together in the near future. Yet this was a tactical move.

At the same time, however, Tudjman is serious about the confederation proposal, even though the chances of its implementation may lie in the distant future. Generally, Tudjman repeated what he declared yesterday evening. He expressed moderate satisfaction, but made very vague statements. Thus, all kinds if interpretation are possible.

[Beindorf] What controversial issues were discussed? What about Mostar or access to the Adriatic Sea for the Muslims?

[Wagner] It was difficult to find that out. The following became known: Croatia wants to keep Mostar, Tudjman stated. The reason he gave was that Mostar is the only large town that the Bosnian Croats control in Bosnia—even though not entirely at the moment. The Muslims, however, largely control Sarajevo, Senica, and Tuzla. The Croats need Mostar as an administrative center for the state of Herceg-Bosnia that they proclaimed unilaterally.

Tudjman also stressed that the proportional representation of the ethnic groups has changed at the expense of the Croatians since the beginning of the war. It is very difficult to verify that at the moment because, as we know, tens of thousands of Muslims are living in a kind of ghetto in the eastern part of the town at present. Nobody knows exactly how many there are. The only thing that is certain is that the number of Muslims and Croats was about the same in this town before the war.

As far as access to the Adriatic Sea is concerned, Tudjman made it clear that Neum, the 10-km-wide strip that belonged to Bosnia in the old Yugoslavia, will be taboo for the Bosnian Muslims. It should only be used touristically. Thus, the old proposal continues to be valid: A free port in Ploce, and a small inland port on the Neretva river, which flows into the Adriatic Sea about 10 km north of Ploce. Yet the river is not navigable at present. That would require difficult construction measures. This is all that has become known concerning Mostar and access to the Adriatic Sea.

[Beindorf] Mr. Wagner, let me ask you a brief final question. After yesterday's joint talks, Alija Izetbegovic was expected to participate in the news conference. Do you know the reasons for his absence?

[Wagner] Well, one can only speculate. It is known that the German Government, the Foreign Ministry, declared its readiness to arrange a joint news conference if agreement is reached during the talks. This means that a joint news conference was only planned in the event of a positive outcome. However, this is not the case. No positive or specific result has been achieved. Izetbegovic departed for Sarajevo this morning, and he may present his report to the press there today. Franjo Tudjman gave a news conference here at 1100. It has also become known that a quarrel erupted behind the scenes between the delegations of the Muslims and the Croats and the Foreign Ministry because no joint news conference was arranged.

Croatia's Tudjman 'Pleased' With NATO Summit

LD1101201694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Journalists showed great interest in the Croatian view of the negotiations in the Croatian Embassy in Bonn this morning. The majority of the journalists' questions referred to the cease-fire agreement—an agreement which the Croatian side had put forward—and the status of Neum. We are singling out as particularly important remarks made by the Croatian president regarding the results and conclusions of the NATO summit in Brussels:

[Begin Croatian President Franjo Tudjman recording] It was with great expectations that the world awaited the NATO conclusions. As far as we are concerned, we can be pleased with those points referring to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, particularly the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These conclusions for the first time show a higher level of resolve to apply force, air strikes not only against those who are strangling Sarajevo, but also against those who are preventing the passage of humanitarian aid, and also against those who are threatening certain areas by their offensive combat operations. This is very important for us, as this directly refers to the current Muslim offensive in central Bosnia. From that point of view, it seems that these conclusions will also contribute to speeding up and concluding negotiations on restoring peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

Ministry Protests 'Violations' by Greek Ships

AU1101203394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The Defense Ministry spokesman reports that yesterday a watchtower guard for the Navy forces observed a Greek patrol ship entering Albanian territorial waters south of Qefal Cape at approximately 1610. At 1615, after approaching within 1 mile of the Albanian coast, this Greek military ship fired a volley. The ship not only violated our territorial waters but sailed in these waters for 20 minutes. The ship left after a torpedo boat of the Sarande coastal district appeared.

The Defense Ministry spokesman declares that this is not the only case. As we have reported before, on 5 November 1993 the Greek military ship Matis violated our territorial waters and sailed eight miles into our territory. On 4 January 1994 another Greek ship entered our waters and opened fire against an Albanian motor boat which was fishing within our territorial waters.

The Defense Ministry reports that these actions by Greek patrol ships constitute serious violations of the territorial waters of the Republic of Albania. The Ministry protests and asks the appropriate Greek bodies to prevent these cases, because the use of firearms within the territory of Albanian Navy waters runs in flagrant opposition to international laws and conventions. All these constitute a serious provocation within Albanian territorial waters and infringe upon the relations of good-neighborliness between the two countries.

We also want to make known that the Albanian Navy forces are engaged and ready to energetically act to preserve the inviolability of Albanian territorial waters.

Meksi Greets Papandreou on EC Presidency

AU0701154894 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi has sent a telegram to His Excellency Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of the Republic of Greece, on the occasion of Greece's taking over the EC presidency.

I have the pleasure to send you my most cordial greetings and best wishes for the success of this important mission, the telegram says. Mr. Meksi expresses his conviction and wishes that this lofty mission will serve development, welfare, and peace in the region and beyond.

Prime Minister Meksi expresses his conviction that this new mission of Greece will help in developing and expanding further the friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries and in boosting general development and Albania's integration into Europe.

Diplomatic Ties Established With Kyrgyzstan

AU1101163094 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The Foreign Ministry reports that yesterday our country established diplomatic relations with Kyrgyzstan at the ambassadorial level. On this occasion the governments of both countries expressed their desire and readiness to further expand these relations.

Foreign Ministry Greets 'Partnership' Plan

AU1101192894 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] A special declaration issued by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Bulgaria regarding the NATO summit held in Brussels states as follows:

The Partnership for Peace initiative is a qualitatively new step in the relations between the partner countries and NATO.

We welcome with satisfaction the North Atlantic Alliance's readiness to open up in relation to the problems of security in Eastern Europe and to accept new members in the future. We regard the holding of consultations with NATO in the event of an immediate threat to the security of certain Central and Eastern European countries as one the most promising and useful forms of political cooperation within the framework of the initiative.

The Republic of Bulgaria declares its interest in taking part in the implementation of the Partnership for Peace initiative, which is in conformance with Bulgaria's readiness to share the responsibility for strengthening stability and security in Europe.

Expatriates Agency Protests Serbian Exit Fees

AU1201075694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The Agency for Bulgarians Abroad is concerned over the new exit fees imposed by the Republic of Serbia, under which every citizen of the Republic has to pay a fee of 10 German marks [DM] per person and DM30 for a private vehicle when departing from the country for abroad. These fees make it difficult for our compatriots in the Western Outlands [border region of Serbia inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians] to maintain contacts with their friends and relatives in Bulgaria and limits their possibilities of visiting our country, which in many cases is for them the only way of obtaining essential goods.

The Agency for Bulgarians Abroad proposes that the competent Bulgarian institutions should take steps through diplomatic channels to obtain exemption from the exit fees for Yugoslav citizens of Bulgarian nationality, especially those living in the municipalities near the border and those who have close relatives in Bulgaria.

Cooperation in Production With Russia Discussed

AU1201110094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] On 12 January Evgeni Matinchev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Interdepartmental Council on Issues of the Military-Industrial Complex and Mobilization Readiness, met Anatoliy Semyonovich Gavrikov, Russian trade representative in Bulgaria.

Issues related to the state of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of special production and the prospect of developing it in the future were discussed. The information was provided by the Press Center of the Council of ministers.

Arms Officials Dismissed After Albania Deal

AU1101113894 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Jan 94 p 3

[24 CHASA staff report: "Valentin Aleksandrov Fires Army Chiefs"]

[Text] [Defense Minister] Valentin Aleksandrov fired Colonel Valentin Popinski, chief of the "Supply and Trade" Administration, and his deputy, Colonel Stoyan Tsakov, for breach of discipline, a well-informed source reported on 5 January.

The defense minister did not give the reason for the dismissal of the two officers. We have learned that the two officers were responsible for carrying out deals in military and other production of the ministry's economic unit, known as Defense Ministry-2.

The source notes that if the dismissal was for corruption, the accused will be temporarily suspended and their case transferred to the prosecutor's office.

One rumor has it that Popinski and Tsakov have been removed because of the so-called Albanian deal.

In September the Defense Ministry sold 100 mortars (120-mm) and mines to Tirana. The arms were transported with Albanian trucks.

The deal was cleared with the government team for the defense industry, General Simeon Petkovski from the Defense Ministry, said. The suspicion exists, however, that a part of the mortars arrived in Bosnia instead of Tirana. However, our military merchants were not responsible for the Albanian trucks' route and destination.

Commentary Views BSP-SDS Relations

AU1101183794 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Commentary by Neven Kopandanova: "A Colossus on Feet of Clay"]

[Text] No matter how cleverly the Socialists are trying to conceal not only the visible cracks in their party's unity, but also the lack of clear concepts for the country's future development, likely to conform with the preferences of their electorate, BSP leader Zhan Videnov's visit, which he paid to the headquarters of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], at 134 Rakovski Street, yesterday, revealed even more transparently the weakness of the 100- year-old party. The fact that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is trying to restrict the president's prerogatives, or even to replace him, has long since been

discussed, not only behind the closed doors of the BSP headquarters at 20, Positano Street. The present initiative of the Socialists can hardly be defined as the result of their foreboding about forthcoming elections, alone. One of the latest causes of concern for Videnov's people seems to be a possible, new reorganization of the parliamentary structures under the aegis of the head of state. The separation of living political organisms such as the Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] and of the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] from the aging body of the BSP, which is evidently underway, would deprive the giant party from its control over parliamentary events and from the possibility of overthrowing the government at a convenient time.

The fact that the president himself is no longer a decisive force in political life is beyond any doubt. However, the danger that he might stand behind a vigorous parliamentary center force, or even support the SDS, a possibility that has been repeatedly hinted at from the president's headquarters on 2, Dondukov Street, evidently suffices to cause panic among the Socialists, whose political isolation would be devastating in such case. By further stimulating the antipresidential campaign of the SDS, the BSP will presumably rely on threatening our head of state with the SDS guillotine, while trying to make the Democrats more open for reconciliation with their chief opponent, at the same time, and acting as a balancing force between the centers of power so as to preserve control over the situation.

The political game of the Socialists who are trying to pull the strings of the government, while distancing themselves from it at the same time, has long since been unsuccessful. Their current attempt at sharing the responsibility with others, which they tried yesterday, will hardly be more effective. It would be naive to believe that the colossus on clay feet, as the BSP can already be described, could rely on a supportive crutch from the SDS.

We can presume that SDS leader Filip Dimitrov will be subject to a new series of attacks by his fellow party members. The attacks are most likely to come from those who, until recently, accused him of preventing the dialogue with other political forces. Nevertheless, the SDS leader confirmed that those capable of exploiting their opponent's failures are the real winners in the political game.

Klaus Interviewed on Clinton Visit, Issues

LD1101203194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1720 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Regular weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Stahlavsky on 11 January; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Stahlavsky] Prime Minister, the most important event this week is undoubtedly the U.S. President's visit to Prague. This interview is being recorded on Tuesday morning, only a few hours before Bill Clinton's arrival. Do you think that choosing our capital city for the Visegrad Four summit testifies to something that is good for our country?

[Klaus] I do not think we should get involved in endless polemics with our neighbors as to why this meeting is taking place in Prague and not in Budapest or Warsaw. This is pointless, and I know that our neighbors are very sensitive to this sort of thing. On the other hand, it is quite obvious, evident, and clear that choosing Prague was not an act of God and that, therefore, the U.S. side had a reason for making this choice.

[Stahlavsky] In this context, one should note that the volume of U.S. foreign investment in our country is the second highest. In 1993, total foreign investment amounted to $0.5 billion. Was it enough?

[Klaus] I think this was just right, really quite right. I have said repeatedly that it is not the government's job to artificially accelerate or, through various errors, to slow down the influx of foreign investment. This level of foreign investment is absolutely adequate to what the economy needs. I would like to warn, however, against accelerating the influx of foreign capital into nonprivatized enterprises.

[Stahlavsky] When I look back at the days past, one of the important events was undoubtedly Slovakia's overdraft on the limit credit in the mutual clearing account with the Slovak Republic, as well as the relatively fast settlement of this overdraft. However, you said that the method of Czech-Slovak clearing is being analyzed, and you did not rule out its reassessment.

[Klaus] When speaking about the reassessment or supplements to the system, I am not thinking about abolishing it or changing it in any fundamental way. I think the fast Slovak payment is a signal that the Slovak side really fulfills the things that are part of an already signed agreement. This is something for our citizens to differentiate between. As for the property issue, no agreement has been achieved yet. However, where there is an agreement, the Slovak side meets its obligations with great precision. This was also the case in this particular event. [passage omitted]

[Stahlavsky] [passage omitted] At the end of the last year, you indicated that there is a certain revival of useful economic contacts with the countries of the former so-called real socialism bloc. What is your idea of our future cooperation with these countries, especially now, after we, as an unofficial spokesman of Central and East Europe, became a member of the UN Security Council?

[Klaus] The contacts of the Czech Government and Czech politicians, as well as the contacts of Czech business with eastern countries, are growing rather than declining. I think—and I repeat this—this is good.

The Cabinet has made decisions about a number of trips that should take place this year. I am personally sure about a visit to Moscow. Nevertheless, this will be possible when there has been some stabilization, when it has become clear what the newly established parliament will do, whether the stability of the government will or will not be maintained. In any case, I hope this will be decided within a few weeks, and my visit should certainly take place then.

I expect to visit the Baltic republics. I have an invitation from all three governments of these countries. An invitation from Belarus is on my table, as is one from Ukraine. [passage omitted]

Zieleniec Voices 'Concerns' About Russia

AU1101130494 Prague MLADY SVET in Czech No 2, 7 Jan 94 p 14

[Interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Ladislav Zak; place and date not given: "Fear of Russia"]

[Text] [Zak] Do you believe that the situation in Russia represents a certain danger for our region? Are there any concerns about developments there?

[Zieleniec] Of course there exist concerns about developments in Russia or, to be precise, in the entire territory of the former USSR, and not only in our region. They are shared with us by all of Europe, indeed by the entire world. Let us realize that it is a power armed with a nuclear arsenal, a state in which new democratic arrangements are being introduced only with difficulties. There are no democratic traditions in Russia. Traditions are very important phenomena. Russia is struggling against tremendous internal problems, the problems of the minorities within the country, and the large number of Russian minorities outside its territory. This country has experienced 70 years of communism, and we, who lived under it for 40 years, know what a tremendous burden it is, how difficult it is to implement reforms, from economic to legal ones. For a long time to come, developments in Russia will continue to be a source of uncertainty on the one hand, and a subject of interest and desire for stabilization on the other—not only to us but to the entire world.

[Zak] To what degree can Russia's taking exception to NATO's eastward expansion affect the decisionmaking of the West on this matter?

[Zieleniec] We should consider these matters with some restraint because of the present postelectoral situation in Russia. Regarding the alliance associations of the Czech Republic, we should clearly define our goal and go directly after it. After all, it is not possible to indefinitely prolong a situation where countries that have always been part of European history—such as our republic—are to live on the side of the, albeit collapsed but still existent, curtain drawn by Stalin. Therefore, I believe that our integration into the family of West European countries, including institutional integration—that is, also into NATO—is unavoidable. In the long term, any endeavors to derive a solution for European stability solely from developments in Russia will prove wrong. Developments in Russia will certainly be very complex and dynamic, and our integration is a matter so incontestable that it has to happen sooner or later—including membership in the relevant organizations.

[Zak] Would it not be more pragmatic in this situation to coordinate our efforts with those of Poland, Hungary, and, possibly, Slovakia?

[Zieleniec] I believe that this is the case. We have identical interests and say similar things. It is a matter of course.

[Zak] You mentioned the postelectoral situation in Russia. Do you believe that the "shriek" of the Russian side regarding the expansion of NATO eastward has something precisely to do with the internal political situation, or do the external power interests of Russia still exist? Is there danger of this situation coming to a head—that is, that we would play "second fiddle" in talks that will take place mostly between NATO and Russia—that is, "about us without us?"

[Zieleniec] Russia undoubtedly has its interests and articulates them. The West must have its interests, too, and, just the same, we have ours. I believe that, from this point of view, the space in which we are located together with Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary should be outside Russia's sphere of operations—and clearly within the West's sphere of influence. It is apparent that there are attempts to cooperate with Russia and that they are appropriate. There is no point, and it would not be in anyone's interest, in starting new hostilities, when they are not necessary. This does not necessarily imply anything about the future shape of West Europe or its institutional umbrella. The attempts on the part of NATO to get along with Russia certainly do not banish us from Europe.

[Zak] What is the concept of our foreign policy eastward with respect to the present situation in Russia?

[Zieleniec] Developments in Russia following the elections remain for us a great unknown. Nevertheless, our policy from this vantage point is clear. The territory of the former USSR, and Russia in particular, is for us a country of traditional contacts and business interests, and we are trying to be very active in this type of cooperation. On the other hand, we always emphasize that these relations must be based on equality, and our political orientation, our orientation in terms of future integration, is tied to the fate of West Europe. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that general laws of geometry cannot be applied in pol.'ics: If you turn to face someone, it does not mean that you are turning your back on someone else. It simply is not so.

[Zak] Could you comment on the statements by some Russian politicians that, if a NATO expansion eastward occurs, we will automatically become the target of Russian nuclear weapons?

[Zieleniec] Nowadays, nuclear arms are pointed at all kinds of targets; it is simply two sides of the same coin. If, however, we want to participate in the protection of the values of democracy, individual freedom, and a prosperous market economy, we have to expect that someone will not like it. Nevertheless, I do not see any reason why a willingness to protect these values evokes in Russia contemplation about arms.

[Zak] What about the statements by Yeltsin and Kozyrev about the isolation of Russia and concerns of the so-called ordinary Russian citizens about the possible expansion of NATO? Do you not feel as if this originated in the vocabulary of the old-time communist ideologists?

[Zieleniec] I do not know. Russia has always thought very geopolitically. The problem of isolation is well known in Russia because it has been discussed there probably throughout the entire existence of that country. Developments in Russia have always coincided with the clash of two trends—a pro-Western one and a national one leading to closing oneself. There is nothing left but to wish for ourselves and Russia that democracy prevails and that cooperation among all of the countries of Europe, including Russia, be as close as possible.

[Zak] Let us look even more closely toward our borders—at Ukraine. Although it has ratified the START I Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms, the overall outcome is rather awkward. Is there also a threat from the Ukrainian side?

[Zieleniec] No. Ukraine's problems are more or less eastern-oriented. They are the problems of a new state that has emerged from the womb of the USSR. I believe that this has more to do with the general nonproliferation of nuclear arms than a real threat to our region.

Baudys 'Concerned' About Russian Military Plans

AU1101194994 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by (km): "Minister Baudys Is Concerned About the Russian Military Doctrine"]

[Excerpt] Prague—Defense Minister Antonin Baudys yesterday expressed concern about the possible consequences of the Russian Federation's military doctrine, which, in the event of a threat to the country's security

interests, allows for the possibility—maybe—of deploying Russian troops outside the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

"Some of the passages in this military doctrine, which refer to strategic territories and to the possibility of deploying Russian troops outside the Russian Federation and perhaps even the CIS states, cause me considerable concern, because these are not pronouncements made by Mr. Zhirinovskiy, who changes his views very rapidly, but are contained in the state military doctrine," declared Baudys.

In reply to a question on whether Russia is continuing to take the Czech Republic's territory into consideration in the interests of its security, Minister Baudys said: "I do not know, but the formulation of this issue in the doctrine disturbs me."

Minister Baudys considers the stance adopted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the possible expansion of NATO to include certain East European states to be schizophrenic. "On the one hand, President Yeltsin is saying that he does not want Russia to be outmaneuvered and not taken into consideration in the expansion processes, while, on the other hand, he is afraid of NATO's expansion. This is a schizophrenic situation, and I simply do not understand it," said Baudys.

The statement made by the Russian president on Wednesday [5 January], in which he again emphatically rejected the attempts to expand the North Atlantic Alliance, has, according to Baudys, two aspects. "Boris Yeltsin says that the countries of Central and East Europe must make their own decisions regarding their possible incorporation into NATO. The other face of President Yeltsin says, however, that it is necessary to respect certain of Russia's strategic interests. This other face rather disturbs me," he said. [passage omitted]

Coalition Supports, Communists Oppose U.S. Plan

LD1101224894 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 2130 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The coalition parties [the Civic Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Christian Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People's Party, and the Christian Democratic Party] assess positively the U.S. project Partnership for Peace, which was approved by the top officials of NATO countries in Brussels yesterday [10 January].

The Czech Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Social National Party are also positive about the project. All of the above consider this project to be, first of all, the first step to the desirable cooperation of the Czech Republic with NATO.

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Left Bloc disagree with this opinion. They warn against our joining NATO because they see a possible isolation in relation to the remaining partners within the Visegrad Four, as well as the threat of cutting down on our sovereignty.

Slovakia Repays $40-Million Debt

AU1101183894 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by (sim) and CTK: "The Slovaks Have Repaid Their Dollar Debt"]

[Text] Prague—By repaying $40 million yesterday, Slovakia settled the debt it incurred in mutual trade with the Czech Republic when it overdrew its permitted credit margin. However, Slovakia is still some 4.5 billion korunas in debt in the mutual clearing account and, at the moment, is again exceeding the agreed margin. "This tendency is continuing in January; Slovakia is again drawing above the credit margin," said Ota Kaftan, of the Czech National Bank [CNB]. Despite these problems, the clearing method of settling accounts in mutual trade is maintainable for the foreseeable future, and the CNB is taking this into consideration.

EBRD Approves Loans for Vehicle Firm, TV Network

LD1101174194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The management of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] has approved a capital investment of 6.7 million ECU's for Karosa Vysoke Myto [East Bohemian coach manufacturer, which signed a joint-venture agreement with Renault Vehicules Industries in November 1993]. The EBRD management also approved a 15-million-ECU loan and the possible underwriting of a loan of the same size from Czech banks.

The EBRD also approved a $20-million loan, which, if necessary, could be used as a guarantee for the joint-stock company Kabelnet's project to install a 12-channel cable television network in the south city in Prague and in Tabor

Delegation Departs for Visegrad, Clinton Talks

LD1101200294 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] [Announcer] The delegation of the Slovak Republic, headed by President Michal Kovac, left the Bratislava airport by air for Prague late this afternoon. Shortly before his departure for a meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton and the highest representatives of the Visegrad Four, we asked Michal Kovac for his comment on the coming summit.

[Begin recording] [Kovac] We expect that President Clinton will inform us about the conclusions and offer, and we are ready to accept the offer within the framework of Partnership for Peace. We pledge ourselves that we will take immediate action so that we can conclude the relevant agreements. Naturally, this is also an opportunity for us to inform the United States about our endeavors here at home in the Slovak Republic to continue in the process of strengthening the plurality system of democracy, transformation, and economic reforms. As you know, at the same time this will also provide an opportunity for bilateral talks with representatives of the Visegrad Group. [end recording]

[Announcer] Other members of the delegation are Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar; Deputy Prime Ministers Jozef Prokes, Sergej Kozlik, and Julius Toth; Jozef Moravcik, minister of foreign affairs; Jan Ducky, minister of the economy; Irena Belohorska, minister of health; and Imrich Andrejcak, minister of defense. Ambassadors of the Slovak Republic to Prague and Washington Ivan Mjartan and Branislav Lichardus are also in the delegation.

Government Supports Partnership for Peace

LD1101221694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The Slovak Government took an unambiguously positive stance and demonstrated unreserved support to the Partnership for Peace initiative at its first meeting this year, which took place today.

Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik said at a news conference that he had been authorized by the government to immediately set up working groups for drafting contractual documents on Slovakia's joining this initiative.

Meciar on European, Domestic Issues

LD1101222394 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar by unidentified reporter on 11 January; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Prime Minister, the meeting between representatives of the four countries of the Visegrad group and U.S. President Bill Clinton is to begin tomorrow. In this connection the remark made by the British Prime Minister John Major yesterday did not come out very optimistically; in connection with the Partnership for Peace program as well as in connection with our possible entry into NATO, he mentioned only Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. This was, however, not the first time that Slovakia has been somewhat forgotten. What do you see as the main reason for western countries adopting such an attitude?

[Meciar] In the case of Mr. Major, this did not amount to a fundamental political attitude. He was merely citing countries as an example. What was decisive for us were the discussions which we had with the U.S. delegation last Sunday, and those discussions were positive. They involved several important areas. The first one was that the question is no longer of who will join NATO. The question is only when and how. The second fundamental question is that the United States has an interest in the security of the Slovak Republic. It belongs to its sphere of immediate interests and we also discussed ways of what kind of guarantees should be given to that security. The third important area is that the Slovak government accepts without any reservations and comments the Partnership for Peace in the form it has been proposed. Already today the government has instructed ministers to set up a working commission to enable us to be among the first ones to conclude that agreement. We are not concerned to be the first in respect of wanting to compete against time, or in terms of prestige. We merely want this matter to be resolved as soon as possible. The contractual principle will enable contractual adjustments to all relations which are of interest to both sides. They involve both our interest and the interest of NATO.

Furthermore, in Prague tomorrow, apart from this question, we will also discuss bilateral questions of Slovak-U.S. relations. Here, too, we are interested in intensifying them. The message Mrs Albright read out to me as the message from President Clinton was more than encouraging.

[Reporter] Would it be possible to say at this moment that after the recent talks with Mrs Albright our chances for gaining entry to NATO are good?

[Meciar] They are at least as certain as Polish, Hungarian, and the Czech Republic. They are not worse.

[Reporter] Prime Minister, this is in effect your first interview for the media this year. I would therefore like to ask you what the government's working program will look like this year.

[Meciar] The government will devote itself to fundamental problems in 1994. [passage omitted] It is necessary to focus on practical problems and not on questions of who is against whom and who will triumph over whom. The outcome then will be commensurate with what we want to achieve. Parties which will want to cooperate with us will find partners in us.

[Reporter] Another meeting of the parliament is approaching. It is rumored that apart from the proposal to dismiss Minister Hofbauer, the opposition is again gathering support to force a vote of no confidence in the government. It has been even reported in the press today that Mr. Cernak [chairman of the Slovak National Party] has been having talks with some representatives of the Hungarian political parties in this connection. Are you aware of these attempts, and how do you assess them?

[Meciar] To force a vote of no confidence in the government, it is necessary to secure 76 votes in the parliament. If they are gathered, then the vote of no confidence will succeed. I regard this, however, as hardly probable. Talks between political parties about when and how to overthrow the government have been going on for several months even in the highest places. This is borne out by the call made by Mr. President on 1 January 1994 which I regard as very unfortunate and inappropriate.

As regard circumstances determining political peace—everyone has to know what he or she wants to provoke. There is no other alternative to the government. It would be simple to drive the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia into opposition but who would then form a constructive government? To provoke elections may mean for those who are sowing the wind at present that they will not be in the next parliament. Decision making in this respect is therefore relatively complicated.

I regard privatization issue as being the key problem that will face the January plenary session of the parliament. The Party of the Democratic Left has made certain proposals that would lead to a system that would be akin to Treuhand used by the Federal Republic of Germany, in its eastern part, which I regard as rather unfortunate and inappropriate for the Slovak economy and economic policy. We shall therefore have to discuss it to ensure that the matter is resolved if possible before the parliament meets.

[Reporter] It has been rumored that a certain tension is prevailing in the government. It has been specifically rumored that Vice Premier Roman Kovac and minister Moravcik may be dismissed. Can you either confirm or reject these reports?

[Meciar] Two conditions must be met if they are to be dismissed from their posts, either the parliament forces a vote of no confidence in them and I know nothing about it, or the premier will propose their dismissal and I also know nothing about it.

[Reporter] The recent Saturday meeting in Komarno is still, so to say, a hot issue. What is the government's stance to the results of this meeting?

[Meciar] Roman Kovac, as the first deputy premier in charge of minorities issues, is authorized to take stance on behalf of the government.

As for the Komarno meeting, it has to be perceived from several points of views, and the possibility of assessing it varies accordingly. It begins by assessing the declaration which continues in a pressure system calling for a certain arrangement that would eventually stop, and ends by assessing the definitive goal, the secession [sentence as received]. This is already an area where such statements and political interests come into conflict with the constitution.

The territorial set-up must be perceived from a broader perspective, not merely as a set-up determined by the language. [passage omitted]

We need to build the republic on the principle of civic solidarity and not on the language principle. [passage omitted]

It is important that citizens of Hungarian origin distanced themselves from those who think that they can speak on behalf of all. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Does it mean that you consider the results of the Komarno meeting to be legitimate and that you are going to discuss this issue or that you are going to deal with it in a more systematic way?

[Meciar] I am not going to discuss the integrity of the Slovak Republic's territory and its division, or steps that could lead to the violation of this territory, with anybody. There is nothing to discuss. This is a topic that will not be discussed with me.

As for the demands that are related to some of the requirements regarding the state administration, there can be an opinion on small districts [obvod] that are to be be defined within the territorial set-up. However, no ethnic principle will be applied in Slovakia. It is not possible for us to force somebody from Medzibrodie to travel to Komarno to get his planning permission, and lose two days just because of that. That is absolutely unworkable. There are also a number of other activities that cannot be carried out in this way.

To summarize, the territorial set-up being drafted by the government reflects the historical development of Slovakia. It reflects either the large counties [zupa] after Czechoslovakia was established or the territorial set-up that was in force here until 1960-61, or—in the event that they are not satisfied, there is the danger of returning to three large regions [sentence as heard]. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Thank you for the interview.

Foreign Minister on Membership in NATO

LD1101161394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik by studio announcer Pospisilova in Bratislava—live]

[Excerpts] [Pospisilova] [passage omitted] A short while ago, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik told the government that we want to use the Prague session not

simply to yet again reiterate the Slovak Republic's interest in NATO membership, but also to present a major initiative toward intensifying economic contacts between the United States and the Slovak Republic. Minister Moravcik is now at the microphone.

Minister, let us first go back to yesterday's Brussels summit. British Prime Minister John Major, speaking at the summit, characterized the Partnership for Peace as an evolutionary program that could lead to NATO membership—but for some countries only. What will the Slovak Republic have to do in order to, in John Major's words, find its place among those selected countries? What is it that Slovakia can and is willing to offer?

[Moravcik] The summit passed a very important document, the summit statement. It should be signed by all of the countries wanting to join the project, and the government of the Slovak Republic is ready to sign it. Following a government decision, a special group, consisting of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense officials, will be set up in the next few days in order to prepare and realize the signing of the relevant documents.

[Pospisilova] Minister, don't you think that in the past few days some well-known foreign politicians and mass media eliminated Slovakia from the process of joining NATO, even before the process could start? For example, CNN television used the argument that Slovakia's interest in joining NATO was not quite as obvious as the interest demonstrated by Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. What do you think Slovakia has done to deserve such treatment, subtle as it is?

[Moravcik] I am not aware that we have been pursuing NATO membership less keenly than other Visegrad Four countries. We have used every occasion to present our position quite clearly. [passage omitted]. I would not read too much into such statements because, in all my personal dealings with foreign representatives—and some of them have failed now and then to mention Slovakia as a country keen to join NATO—I received assurances that Slovakia was counted in the same way as the rest of the Visegrad group countries. In assessing the situation objectively, we find there is no reason whatsoever to think that Slovakia is less well prepared as a partner than anyone else. We are definitely in the first group.

[Pospisilova] Apart from meeting Bill Clinton, you will have bilateral talks with the members of other delegations. Are you going to discuss the demands of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia with your Hungarian counterpart?

[Moravcik] The position of the Hungarian minority can be dealt with only in the context of our effort to prepare an all-European document. In all other respects, the position of the Hungarian minority in our country is our internal affair.

Kovac Addresses Message to Army Members

AU1101173294 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Jan 94 pp 1,2

[TA SR report: "Slovakia Will Not Become a Toy in the Hands of the Strong"]

[Excerpt] Trencin—A festive rally of Army of the Slovak Republic commanders was held in Trencin yesterday, on the occasion of the beginning of the second year of the existence of the Slovak Republic and the building of the Army of the Slovak Republic. It was attended by Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak, Army Commander Lieutenant General Julius Humaj, and senior members of the Army of the Slovak Republic Officers' Corps.

At the outset of the rally, its participants heard a letter addressed by President Michal Kovac to the participants in the rally. The letter states, among other things, that in the security and political spheres, we are oriented unequivocally toward NATO and the West European Union (WEU). We are looking for guarantees to ensure that Slovakia will never again become a toy in the hands of the strong.

As Michal Kovac went on to stress, according to ideas communicated by former U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin, participation by the Slovak Republic, along with the other states of the Visegrad Group, in the Partnership for Peace initiative should serve as an intermediary organizational link on the road toward fully fledged NATO membership. This should mean the possibility of achieving a certain type of associate membership of NATO or the WEU. According to Michal Kovac, this would not require full integration of the military components, but should at least contain guarantees that the parties will be consulted whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either party will be jeopardized, in the opinion of one of them.

In another part of his letter, Michal Kovac appreciated the fact that, in defiance of complicated conditions, the division of the former Federal Army has been completed in a relatively short period of time. He assured Army members that he will see to it that all necessary conditions be established for the Army of the Slovak Republic to discharge its duties and for it to be accorded such a degree of social recognition as corresponds to the nature and significance of its work for the benefit of the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

Ministry Concerned Over Hungarian Activity

LD1101225294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Ivo Hlavacek, the director of the legal and consular department in the Slovak Foreign Affairs Ministry, handed over to Jenoe Boros, the Hungarian charge d'affaires, in Bratislava today a written statement in which the ministry expresses its concern over the activity of the Hungarian governmental office for Hungarian minorities abroad. The specific reason for the ministry's

concern is that this office drafted and disseminated in foreign diplomatic circles information on the so-called Komarno initiative that takes matters out of context and, according to our ministry, is nonobjective and misleading. The Foreign Ministry said Slovakia did all it could to meet specific obligations it had accepted on joining the Council of Europe.

Duray Urges 'Self-Administration' Over 'Autonomy'

AU1101163594 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 7 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence (Egyutteles) Movement, by Ivan Durcik; place and date not given: "Autonomy Is Parliament's Business"]

[Text] [Durcik] The official program of the Komarno rally no longer mentions the possibility of establishing autonomy. If, nonetheless, autonomy got onto the rally's agenda, what would be the response of your movement, which endorsed the convening of this undertaking?

[Duray] Should there be discussion about self-administration in Komarno, we can only endorse this view. Reinforcing the role of self-administration bodies is in the interest not only of the people of Zitny Ostrov [Rye Island, Hungarian-populated area in southern Slovakia] but of all residents of the Slovak Republic. This is the only realistic option, because the only democratic way to achieve autonomy is by means of a law. And for such a law to be passed, it is necessary to gain a majority in parliament.

[Durcik] Do you want to suggest that the term "autonomy" did not figure even on the original agenda of the Komarno rally?

[Duray] No. The Hungarian parties that endorsed this rally (Coexistence and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement—SLOVENSKY DENNIK note) have never spoken about territorial autonomy. What we want is a system of self-administration, in which communities and regions would have the powers that they need to deal independently with the problems of the local population.

[Durcik] The Slovak Government is in a difficult situation. The coalition is not working and the results in the economic sector are very weak. Do you not think that, by organizing activities such as the Komarno rally, the Hungarian minority is voluntarily getting into the role of a culprit, whom the government can blame for every failure?

[Duray] It is true that Prime Minister Meciar is intensively looking for people whom he could blame for his own failures. By creating the image of an enemy, the present government is trying to lay all the blame on the Hungarian minority, opposition politicians, disloyal journalists, and so forth. It is not our activities that directly help the government, however, but, rather, the stands of some "opposition" politicians. During the vote on the budget, our deputies voted in unison against the government draft, while the chairman of the strongest opposition party and one Christian Democratic Movement deputy supported the government draft. To ascribe their voting to the fact that the Hungarians were organizing a rally in Komarno would be a bit much.

[Durcik] Recently you mentioned that you could imagine a broader government coalition with the participation of your movement, as well as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], in the event that there is a change of prime minister. Do you think that the demands of the Hungarian minority would be easier to realize without Meciar?

[Duray] I do not see the main problem in one person but, rather, in people's thinking. It is as though, after obtaining independence, the Slovaks were surprised to find out that there are also Hungarians in Slovakia. Through our activities, we want to draw the attention of our Slovak fellow citizens to the fact that we live here and that we want to coexist with them as citizens with equal rights. This aim is also to be served by our rally in Komarno.

Gypsies Condemn Election Law Provisions

94P20206A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Dec p 4

[Unattributed article including statement by Antonia Haga, National Assembly representative of the Alliance of Free Democrats: "Osztojkan Leaves SZDSZ, to Antonia Haga's Regret"]

[Text] The leaders of 12 Romany organizations in Hungary wrote a letter to Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic, asking him not to sign the amended election law because it completely precludes any possibility that the ethnic minorities will gain parliamentary representation in their own right.

The National Assembly's decision is not concerned at all with the rights of minorites and is contrary to the Constitution, the minority law, and the stance that the parties and the public profess to take toward minorites, announced Bela Osztojkan, president of the Phralipe Independent Gypsy Organization at the years-end meeting of Romany organizations.

The Gypsy organizations do not have enough resources at their disposal today to get even one Gypsy representative elected to the parliament on their own. They have started negotiations with Peter Zwack's Civic Party concerning possible cooperation, and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] will probably run two Romany candidates—Jozsef Raguly of the Hundred-Member Gypsy Orchestra and Florian Farkas of Lungo Drom—in the elections. At the end of the meeting Bela Osztojkan said that the parliament is completely insensitive to the problems of the minorities, and for this reason he as an individual will not vote and will leave the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ].

"I am sorry that Bela Osztojkan will leave the SZDSZ, but I am even sorrier that neither he nor I can find a better solution for the representation of the minorities in the present parliamentary structure," said Antonia Haga, Romany representative and member of the SZDSZ's parliamentary group. The representative does not consider acceptable either the present situation or the version of the election law that was voted down, which would have put 13 representatives into the National Assembly on the basis of minority lists. "This way, once again only token Gypsies, token Croatians, and token Swabians, who would not even be able to come to agreement on the most important questions, would sit in the parliament." According to Antonia Haga, appropriate minority representation is imaginable only in a two-chamber parliament.

[According to Duna TV, on 7 January President Goncz told the Minority Roundtable that he has not decided yet whether he will sign the election law or submit it to the Constitutial Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. He added that he has 13 days to make a decision.]

Fur on Situation in Hungarian Democratic Forum

AU1101173094 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Zoltan Fekete; place and date not given: "The Forum Overcame Its Internal Conflicts"]

[Text] Defense Minister Lajos Fur resigned from the position of executive chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] on 26 May 1993. Although he maintained his membership in the Executive Committee, Lajos Fur accepted larger political roles in the party's internal life only recently.

[Fekete] Would you accept a renewed nomination for the position of executive chairman or the position of party chairman if you were asked now, or your volunteer withdrawal continues?

[Fur] I do not hide from rational challenges of fate.

[Fekete] In other words, you would accept the nomination.

[Fur] If I am asked to or if I am elected, I will accept.

[Fekete] What has changed since your resignation?

[Fur] My party has changed a lot since I wrote my letter. I do not mean here the change in the external and internal image of the party, but mostly the changes that took place in the people's souls. Of course, we should not forget that the MDF did not disintegrate after the split and, after the well-known internal conflicts, we are now much more united than before. Our members have a goal again: To be successful at the upcoming elections. We not only have goals, but our old enthusiasm has returned, and this clearly proves that the MDF has overcome its internal conflicts. I feel as if the enthusiasm of 1989-90 has returned, and this gives cause for optimism.

[Fekete] Will the MDF be able to replace the late party chairman and prime minister, Jozsef Antall?

[Fur] No one is irreplaceable and no one is replaceable. Both opinions are true. Jozsef Antall was a great democrat. It is impossible to replace him overnight. No matter who it is, the future party chairman can grow into a key figure as Jozsef Antall used to be. Everyone has the fieldmarshal's baton in his bag, but the standards are very high.

[Fekete] Has Jozsef Antall's death not thrown Hungary's position back? I mean here primarily our foreign policy.

[Fur] Although some statement that appeared especially in the West mentioned this, and there are also some voices at home according to which the government drifted to the right after Jozsef Antall's death, these are unfounded opinions. With its new interior minister, the Hungarian Government is working according to its well-known program. I must say that, during my talks so far, I did not feel any deterioration in Hungary's leading

positions. I met recently not only with the heads and defense ministers of the Visegrad countries but also with high-ranking U.S. politicians and leaders.

[Fekete] As a party chairman, would you be able to create a unity similar to the consensus achieved during the legislation of the defense law as a defense minister?

[Fur] It is much easier to compromise in the Parliament in the benefit of the country and society than within the party. However, a political party is always created by a common ideology, common interests, and common goals.

[Fekete] You spoke of enthusiasm. In your opinion, for what election results is this enthusiasm sufficient?

[Fur] If our enthusiasm grows, our calm continues, and "reason prevails" in our society, then our chances will be very good. Even if we cannot repeat our last success of 42 percent, we can get more than 20 percent of the votes, and we can even be the first with this number of votes.

[Fekete] What do you mean by the society's "reason"?

[Fur] If most people accept the fact that this coalition government carried out what its possibilities allowed it to carry out, if understanding also mingles with the justified criticism, and if an increasing number of people realize that another government could not have done much more in this period and after such preliminaries, the chances of the MDF will be really good.

Fur Ready To Be MDF Chairman

LD1001212194 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by unidentified reporter on 10 January; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] You once stepped aside as a party politician, but now you have again become active. What are your aims?

[Fur] I started a large-scale tour around the country from October and November, and during this tour I will visit all counties and have discussions with the leaders and members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and hold lectures, since a great, a very great test [the election], is coming.

I think that if the population, the citizens of the country, realize how much the MDF and the coalition government have done, and that within the range of possibilities they have done the best way that could be done, the Hungarian Democratic Forum will win the elections, perhaps not with such a high percentage of votes as it obtained in 1990, but I am sure that the respective proportion of votes will be above 20 percent.

[Reporter] Would you accept the post of party chairman?

[Fur] I usually do not evade challenges of my fate, particularly when they are sensible challenges. If I have to face such a challenge, I will try to meet it.

MDF Official Comments on Coalition Prospects

AU1101194794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Jan 94 pp 1,7

[Report on interview with Ferenc Kulin, head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Tibor J. Keri on 10 January; place not given: "Fur Has a Chance To Become Party Chairman"]

[Text] In the last week's issue of MAGYAR FORUM, Istvan Csurka strongly attacked the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and one of its spiritual leader, Janos Kis. Among other things, Csurka wrote the following: "With the death of Jozsef Antall, with the fall of the silent partner, the Hungarian political life became unipolar and the boss is now called Janos Kis." According to Csurka, Kis played a decisive role in forcing the national trend and the national radicalism out of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. The present MDF, one that "calms" Kis and his followers, "is small, broken, without principles, far from its original power, namely its Hungarianness, and from taking on the representation of the vital issues of Hungarians; a party that has hidden itself in illusions and frequent substitute actions; a toothless lion"—Csurka wrote.

Ferenc Kulin said last week that the MDF could not envisage any coalition or cooperation with an SZDSZ controlled by Janos Kis.

My position regarding Janos Kis and the SZDSZ is totally independent from Istvan Csurka's article—Ferenc Kulin told our correspondent. From 1989, the SZDSZ has been the anti-pole of the political space in which the MDF is the other determining factor. This distance only increased, instead of decreasing, in the last four years. According to Kulin, this distance became even more clear by the fact that the SZDSZ seems to initiate cooperation with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the other rival of the MDF. Kulin mentioned Janos Kis because it is Kis who has been formulating and dictating the political strategy of the SZDSZ from the very beginning. Kulin added that if anyone had any doubts about this, these doubts would be dissipated by Janos Kis's article published in the Christman issue of MAGYAR HIRLAP. "This is the simple explanation to the question of whether there is a chance of MDF-SZDSZ cooperation. I can say that there is no such chance"—Kulin declared.

According to Ferenc Kulin, the fact that there are no chances whatsoever of any contact or cooperation between the two parties can be explained with pragmatic causes. Kulin pointed out that the MDF is a center party that is polished and formed in the daily political practice, a party that learns from every conflict and corrects them; Janos Kis's SZDSZ is a party "created at a desk, a

party adjusting itself to doctrines and following a strategy." Therefore, it is questionable politically whether these two markedly different political forces can get closer to each other—Kulin pointed out.

In connection with Csurka's writing, Ferenc Kulin said that he did not agree with a single sentence of the essay published in MAGYAR FORUM. His judgment differs from his opinions on previous Csurka-writings because, in the past, he could accept a lot of elements of Csurka's diagnoses. However, this latest writing is the spiritual flight of a man who lost his sense of political reality—Kulin said. He added that Csurka's words on his role and "danger" are among statements that no longer contain anything surprising and, therefore, they need no defense. Kulin also finds it unfortunate that the "objectionable attack" on Jozsef Antall's activity definitely discredited everything that Csurka ever did in Hungarian politics.

In connection with the future, Kulin pointed out that he agreed with Sandor Lezsak, who declared that the corridors that were still open between the MDF and the Hungarian Way Circles closed definitely in the wake of Csurka's attitude following Jozsef Antall's death. These contradictions will only become stronger in the election campaign.

Speaking about the election prospects of the MDF, Kulin said that he was even more optimistic than Lajos Fur, who predicted 20 percent of votes for the MDF. "We still have all the chances to achieve a decisive victory in the individual electoral districts"—Kulin said.

In conclusion, Kulin pointed out that he would not accept even the nomination for the position of party chairman at the national conference to be held in February. He did not know how many people were running for this position, but he said that Lajos Fur had a good chance to win the position.

Horn Views Position Before Elections

AU1101145694 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 5 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Pal Szombathy; place and date not given: "We Will Not Be Short of Coalition Partners"]

[Text] *The discussion on 3 January with [former prime minister, now international banker] Miklos Nemeth will end speculations about his return to Hungary, Gyula Horn told NEPSZABADSAG. Horn said that raising the idea of a future liberal-conservative coalition does not show any political foresight. In his view, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is not in danger of finding itself in quarantine and it will find coalition partners if it achieves good results at the elections.*

[Szombathy] According to our information, on 3 January, you talked to Miklos Nemeth for two and a half hours, and the dilemmas of his political return were the topic of the conversation.

[Horn] It is true that we held a long discussion with Nemeth. We agreed that we would soon jointly inform the public on the result of our consultation.

[Szombathy] Is it correct to assume that your joint statement will end the speculations over his possible return to Hungary?

[Horn] Presumably, yes.

[Szombathy] It is not the first time it has been suggested, and not only by [Federation of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, Chairman] Viktor Orban, that the MSZP should again be refused the chance to form a coalition in 1994 by the parties of the former Opposition Roundtable. In your view, after four years, what are the chances of isolating the MSZP, which certainly appears to be on the rise?

[Horn] If I took the suggestions of Orban and others seriously, then I would also like to ask some questions. For example, the liberal parties have very strongly criticized the government's policy over the past four years; in fact, many of their prominent representatives stated that this executive power should be replaced in 1994. In this case, how do they imagine new cooperation with the government parties? How seriously are we to take everything that they have said over the past four years? In the event of cooperation of this type, the two liberal parties would join in some kind of continuity with the current coalition: If this is so, then they will have to explain this to their own supporters and voters. Why were the other two parties of the liberal bloc left out of this assumed alliance? It was the FIDESZ that said that the liberal coalition of four parties would be able to win the elections. Finally: Is it really so important for them to get into power by all means? In my view, these plans, which even preceded the calling of the elections, are distasteful. We can hear little about the program that the liberals want to implement. The remaining four months will be a serious challenge to the country: Raising this kind of proposal at this moment does not show political foresight.

[Szombathy] Is there a real danger to the MSZP in this kind of possible "quarantine attempt"? Can a more or less united bloc be established to oppose the MSZP?

[Horn] We ended the previous regime four years ago and the MSZP played an important role in this. In democracies, parties do not normally get excluded from cooperation; this is usually done in dictatorships. I do not wish to make predictions, but it will be very difficult for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], and the FIDESZ to cooperate without losing their own political image. The leaders of the SZDSZ are much more cautious in their statements on this issue; presumably their views will become clearer by the time of the elections. For me, the important question is whether the liberals can agree on the social and economic issues that are important for the country.

[Szombathy] Do you expect that, in the event of an MSZP victory at the elections, the other political forces will firmly refuse to form a government with the Socialists ?

[Horn] A kind of evolution has taken place in the way in which the parliamentary parties treat the MSZP: At first, they were condescending toward us, then they spoke about a left-wing danger, and now they are alarming the electors by saying that it is a waste of time to vote for the Socialists because the MSZP would not become a part of the government anyway. In my view, if we achieve a good election result, we will find coalition partners among the current parliamentary parties. I do not think that we will be short of coalition partners. In my view, the important issue is what kind of agreement can be made with the partners as regards the government's tasks. The current nervousness comes from the danger of losing power on one side and from the hope of gaining it on the other. The MSZP is not suffering from either of these illnesses.

[Szombathy] Do you consider it a possibility that the MSZP will be forced to turn down the mandate to form a government?

[Horn] I do not deal with this issue. In January 1994, I find it early and somewhat comical to talk about forming coalitions. The MSZP does not want to commit itself on possible coalition partners or its prime minister candidate.

[Szombathy] According to some people, one of the reasons that you have not named anyone as your prime minister candidate is that the MSZP does not really have any "marketable" prominent people apart from yourself.

[Horn] An increasing number of prominent politicians are appearing in the party; I could mention at least eight to 10 names. Unfortunately, the opposition is in a difficult position in presenting its politicians on Hungarian Television, which has the greatest effect.

[Szombathy] Failing all else, can we arrive at a situation where the MSZP names [SZDSZ Parliamentary Group Leader] Gabor Kuncze as its nominee?

[Horn] I would like to affirm that Gabor Kuncze will not be our prime minister candidate. Whether the MSZP will support Kuncze after the elections is a different issue. It is also to be seen whom, in case of a certain result, the SZDSZ would support for prime minister from the Socialists.... We will draw up our national list in February, but we would not like to commit ourselves to anyone. The country is bound to have a coalition government. For us, it is not a key issue that the leader of the new cabinet should come from the MSZP. The structure of the new government must not be decided by loyalty to a party. I do not exclude the possibility that the next prime minister will not be a leading party politician.

[Szombathy] Does this mean that we can be certain that you will not nominate a prime minister until the elections?

[Horn] Nothing is certain in politics. However, there are no rules that say that the leader of the national list has to be a candidate at the same time. We will maintain our current view on this issue and I do not think that the sensible public will fail to understand this.

[Szombathy] The view can often be heard that the MSZP is not at all interested in getting into government. Is it possible that you will be a constructive opposition with a 20 to 25 percent result?

[Horn] We do not want to get into government by any means: We would not participate in a coalition that does not agree on certain basic economic and political issues, and does not state that people living on wages and salaries cannot be burdened forever with the costs of the changes. However, it was probably our opponents who concocted the story that we are not seriously thinking of taking on a governmental role: All serious parties work to this end. The new government will only have a chance to fulfill its four-year term if it seeks ways for social reconciliation.

[Szombathy] MSZP members often say that stability can only be preserved if the left wing and the trade unions are involved in power. In your view, would a left-wing opposition increase the chances of a government crisis?

[Horn] The new executive will definitely have to come to an agreement with the trade unions. The left wing, which fosters the best relations with them, has the best chance to do this. However, our relations will probably have their problems.

[Szombathy] The MSZP's popularity is increasing. The question is, how much will your individual candidates be able to achieve, coming from different strata of society and entering into the competition from different backgrounds. A larger parliamentary group can also expect conflicts similar to those of the MDF....

[Horn] It is certain that people whom we do not welcome have also appeared around the party, but the party's leadership was not able to influence the selection of the candidates. However, I am not aware of any nominations where the expertise and honesty of the candidate was not taken into consideration. I can only welcome such a broad range of people. Presumably, after the elections, the MSZP's group of deputies will be much larger: The professional structure of the parliamentary group will be important. Naturally, the number of conflicts increases in a larger community. It is a lie to claim that there are any people at all among our candidates who returned as former leaders after turning their backs on politics in 1990.

Border Guard Seeks Armored Vehicles From China

LD1001155894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] The border guard wishes to obtain at least 100 armored carriers from China in exchange for China's state debts. The vehicles would be given to the 19 border patrol companies. The Nikex joint stock company, which has been commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior to conclude the deal, announced that a Hungarian delegation is to travel to Beijing in the next few days in order to gather information. China owes Hungary over seven billion forints.

Trade Union Leader To Head Local HSP List

LD0801190994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Excerpt] At the HSP [Hungarian Socialist Party] delegates' assembly in Miskolc it was finalized that the party's election list in the county will be led by Sandor Nagy, chairman of the largest Hungarian trade union grouping. Peter Juhasz reports.

[Juhasz] Today it was decided that Sandor Nagy, chairman of the MSZOSZ [National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions], will run in the parliamentary elections under the colors of the Socialist Party. This was announced by Imre Szekeres, deputy chairman of the party, in Miskolc after the HSP county organization's session, adding that the regional list will be led by Sandor Nagy.

[Begin Szekeres recording] I presume that behind this decision lies the fact that in the past three and a half years a political cooperation developed between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the trade union organization in which both organizations preserved their independence. We, the leaders of the HSP and the Borsod county organization, believe that this should also be signalled when putting forward candidates. We appointed to the head of the list of a very important county like this a well-known and popular person who represents people's interests not only in the trade union movement but also in social insurance, Dr. Sandor Nagy. [passage omitted] [end recording]

ΩSocietal Impact of Unemployment

94P20200A

[Editorial Report] The 30 December Budapest daily MAGYAR HIRLAP reported that the National Federation of Associations of Job Seekers and Unemployed (MAEOSZ) believes that the unemployment problem is growing despite National Labor Affairs Center (OMK) figures that show the opposite. According to the paper, MAEOSZ executive president Zoltan Zenkovics and associate president Jozsef Simon said in interviews that while OMK data claiming a steady drop in unemployment from 700,000 in February to 635,000 in November are technically correct, they "do not reflect societal developments realistically." Since last spring the "official classification criteria used by the labor affairs centers have changed," the officials asserted. In any case, they said, in 1993 the overall situation of the unemployed "continued to deteriorate" because unemployment benefits have been reduced from two years to one and the actual value of benefits has eroded. "It has therefore become impossible to halt impoverishment, and even on the governmental level they admit that half a million people will never again be able to return to the work force." Long-term unemployment also has an impact on the family, creating "a spiral that may go downward with frightening speed." While unemployment benefits have have helped some people get a new start, in counties such as Nograd, Somogy, and Zala most of the unemployed find themselves "without any options," the officials said.

Zenkovics and Simon charged that government agencies have failed to cooperate with MAEOSZ's efforts to improve the employment situation. MAEOSZ and the Ministry of Labor worked out a "cooperation plan" but MAEOSZ "waited in vain" for an actual agreement from that ministry, while the Ministry of Public Welfare "did not respond at all" to MAEOSZ's requests. In the officials' view, as long as they took "a tolerant stance" they could not get the government to "consider them a partner in working out a clearly conceived employment policy." Therefore, according to MAGYAR HIRLAP, the officials expect that MAEOSZ will be "forced" to "resort to other—strictly legal—measures." First it will have lawyers examine the parts of the social welfare law that appear to be "unconstitutional," and then it will express its protests through county meetings and hunger strikes.

Walesa Departs for Visegrad Talks in Prague

LD1201090594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0637 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 12 Jan—This morning, President Lech Walesa left Warsaw for Prague where he is to meet the leaders of the Visegrad Group and President Bill Clinton. Asked by journalists at Warsaw military airport whether his "propaganda offensive" has changed the position of western states, the president replied: "I think that no more can be done after the NATO summit in Brussels." The president added that world public opinion "should exert greater pressure on politicians not to repeat the same mistakes." "There are opportunities which have to be taken, agreements which have to be kept," the president said, adding that he hopes that in Prague "we do more for a more secure and more human future."

Walesa 'Disappointed' With West, Prague

AU1101153294 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Jan 94 pp 1,5

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Petr Janyska in Warsaw; date not given: "The West Is Deceiving Itself"]

[Text] I am very disappointed, declared Polish President Lech Walesa in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY just prior to the meeting between the four Central European heads of state and the U.S. President. With reference to the Czech Government—which has insisted that Clinton meet separately with the representatives of each country and that no joint communique be adopted—he said the following: "Solidarity is essential during challenging periods. In this case, however, someone is placing particular interests before the common cause. Prague's course of action disturbs me. Public opinion will not forget the politicians in question. In my opinion, they are making a mistake that will cost us all something. The outcome will be important, not the form. Nevertheless, if the talks end in failure, we will be forced to say that it was the fault of the organizers. The Slovaks, Hungarians, and Poles wanted to adopt a joint course of action. I even proposed that Vaclav Klaus deliver a joint statement on behalf of all four countries. He did not take up this suggestion, however."

[Janyska] Mr. President, what, in your opinion, will the NATO summit bring to Poland and Central Europe? Under what circumstances will it be possible to talk about success?

[Walesa] If a clear concept for Europe's security arises from the meeting and if a specific form for our partnership derives from it. That is, if a timetable for joint programs is set and if it is clearly stated that "Partnership for Peace" will lead to our full membership in NATO (even if Russia is opposed to this) and if the political and military criteria for such membership are determined.

We want NATO to enhance its potential as fast as possible by evolutionary means and to attach as many European post-communist states as possible to its blood circulation system. Two years ago, I suggested that Central Europe prepare for entry into NATO and this is how I understand "Partnership for Peace."

The West is making out that we want something from it. This is a mistake; on the contrary, we are offering it something. We want to expand the region of its security. Naturally, this will also—in turn—benefit us.

[Janyska] What if only non-specific statements ensue from the summit?

[Walesa] Then all the moral, political, and military responsibility will fall on Western Europe and the United States. They used to appeal to us to overthrow communism. We got rid of it, the Soviet Union collapsed, and we dissolved the Warsaw Pact. And what has the West done in the wake of all of this? Central Europe is a vacuum; the only change is the reunification of Germany.

Here in the Belvedere Palace in August, we managed to obtain Yeltsin's written agreement that Russia will not object to our joining NATO. This was a unique historical opportunity. A political gesture from the West would have been enough: That Central Europe has some hope of joining the Alliance and that we belong to the West and not the East. The West said nothing, however.

A course of action such as this one and an insufficiently active policy lead to phenomena like Zhirinovskiy. The West does not want to provoke the bear; however, the bear perceives this cautiousness as temerity. Zhirinovskiy is not the cause, but the effect. The West is deceiving itself. It talks about partnership, but what kind of partnership can it be if one partner sets the conditions and blackmails the other?

[Janyska] What will Poland do if the summit in Brussels really does end ambiguously?

[Walesa] We will not ease up on the pressure that we will want to continue to exert within the framework of the Visegrad Group. We are not interested in who is first or second. Today's partners have to understand each other better. Those who do not want to play together will be left out. We will begin to consider other, more realistic forms. These will not be confrontational, because we are concerned about the security of everyone. We want the joint lungs of Europe, western and eastern, as the Holy Father once said, to learn to breath together for the sake of the whole organism.

[Janyska] Are we to understand, for example, that you are referring to the Western European Union under the concept of "more realistic forms"?

[Walesa] Yes, it too. We will be affiliated to it in February.

In short: We will have all our irons in the fire. Western Europe will have to expand toward the East sooner or later; it has no other choice. It will again be faced with the question of what to do with us.

What was it that Clinton did recently? His country could not develop further internally, it was afflicted by economic decline, overproduction, and unemployment. So, he decided to increase his options and NAFTA [North American Free Trade Association] was born.

Western Europe, however, is afraid of such a bold step. It acts like an old man shut away in a magnificent room until a young man bursts in and describes how beautiful it is outside and says he will open the window. The old man does not want this; apparently, he will catch cold. The young man tries to make him change his mind, telling him it will be good for him, but the old man does not believe this.

It is not that we would be better off than the West, but we have the upper hand as far as the internal vital strength of our people is concerned.

[Janyska] You said recently that the current situation reminds you of 1939 and the occupation....

[Walesa] Yes. At that time, Poland said that is was not fighting for Gdansk, but for the whole of Europe; however, no one wanted to believe us. During the War, we spoke about the Gulag, about Katyn, about the fact that Poland has already been wiped off some maps, but the West did not want to hear about this. Hitlerism and Stalinism were just as bloody, but each of them was treated differently. A war was waged against one, while wine and coffee were drunk with the other and negotiations were held—all of this was done by politicians considered to be heroes. We struggled for years to free ourselves from such a situation and we do not want history to be repeated.

[Janyska] The West often says that if it lets the Central European countries into NATO, how can it refuse other countries later? Why let in Warsaw and not Vilnius?

[Walesa] This is a matter of clear political and economic criteria. I have outlined the following scenario many times: The Visegrad Group will join NATO first, then the Baltic republics, and then—according to their level of readiness—Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, or Bulgaria.... Thus, the Western way of thinking and Western technology would make their way slowly toward the East, right up to Russia.

The Western concept that wants to invest in Russia directly may only lead to Russian neoimperialism.

[Janyska] The NATO countries often claim that we are under no dire threat and that, if it bothers Russia so much, we should not press the Alliance for entry. What do you think? Is Poland afraid of Russia?

[Walesa] It looks as though Western Europe and the United States are making concessions to Russia, and I do not like this. If it continues like this, perhaps we will have to negotiate with Yeltsin about entry into NATO and not with Clinton.

We are not afraid of Russia. If Moscow were to adopt a harder line, we would just be a tiny morsel for it. The things they do not have—wealth, state-of-the-art technology—would have to be sought in Western Europe. We would not be enough for them. This is what Western Europe should be afraid of.

We want to join NATO mainly in order to eliminate the malignancy that can feed off nationalism and the various demons of the past. We do not want anyone to die for us. After all, our membership in NATO would provide a political guarantee that nothing like this will ever be required in Central Europe. It will provide an assurance for the foreign capital coming into our country that it will be calm here and that—for instance—Russia will not invade. Reference is often made to the hostility between Greece and Turkey, but NATO is a guarantee that neither of the two sides can "stir up" too much trouble.

[Janyska] How did you manage to obtain a written statement from Yeltsin in August that Moscow will not object to Poland's membership in NATO?

[Walesa] Simple: By the force of our arguments.

It is in the interests of the new, democratic Russia to have equal partners with whom it could cooperate. Only an imperial Russia would require an ambiguous sphere of influence, I said and asked: Do you want to be a democratic country or an empire? In view of the fact that the answer was a democratic country, I continued: In this case, let us reduce the size of the region of insecurity that always threatens conflicts. This argument convinced Yeltsin, as it did Grachev and Kozyrev the next day. The democratic part of the delegation understood that this was a chance for the whole of democratic Russia.

We consider Yeltsin's signature on this document to be valid. No one has written to us from Russia telling us that we should annul it.

[Janyska] How do you explain the later shift in Russia's position?

[Walesa] Simple. Lenin said to his soldiers: Push until you meet with resistance, then withdraw. Yeltsin has realized that the West is not putting up any resistance to him, that it is succumbing to his diktat. He would not be a politician if he did not do what he is doing now.

We maintain that NATO would come close to Russia's borders not as an anti-Russian alliance, but as a zone of stability. It evolved as a defense mechanism against the eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist, so why all the fear? Does today's Russia consider itself to be their heir and successor and does it see NATO as an unequivocally hostile institution?

[Janyska] At the beginning of the interview you said that you favor a joint course of action by the Central European states. In your opinion, why is this important?

[Walesa] As the Visegrad Group we have a population of more than 60 million. The word of such a group carries weight. We are too small on our own, as individual states.

Moreover, Europe demands a willingness for consensus and dialogue and it demands that we do not assert exorbitant demands. We have learned this in Visegrad. In a quartet, however, if just one person sings out of tune, the melody is no longer pure.

Walesa Interviewed Before Meeting With Clinton

LD1101210594 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Grzegorz Miecugow; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Miecugow] In connection with the NATO stance and the final shape of the Partnership for Peace, do you have a feeling of defeat?

[Walesa] No, I think that my actions have yielded some results because I think the outcome could have been even worse. However, I want to say that in my opinion we could have achieved more. In my opinion we could have gone further, but the great powers of this world have decided otherwise and we have to conform to this.

[Miecugow] Do you mean that although more could have been achieved, the current situation is no fault of ours?

[Walesa] There is no fault on our part, because this was beyond our reach. I did all I could to make this step somewhat longer. As a practicing politician, I believe that European geography should be changed, that European direction and development should be prejudged now, that uncertainties should be confronted with visions and concepts. This would be a better way of dealing with things. Why bet on the unknown?

If European geography expands, it would become clear that a zone of uncertainty is becoming smaller. But as I have said—this was not to be. We will have to do much more. We will have to work more, and we will reach the same objective but much more slowly, not by leaps but by crawling.

[Miecugow] Have you got a plan for further actions? How do you want to lead Poland to NATO?

[Walesa] I think that after what I and we have done, the pressure by nations will be greater. I believe that at the same time we will have to go back to the past and speak about international agreements, that they have their consequences. We did not do this after the year 1939 and this is bad because you forget about these things today. You tend to remember our agreements, even the financial ones. Some even have grievances against us, saying that we are not a solid partner. But I want to say that those partners were not honest toward us; we also counted on a different course of events in 1939, but agreements were broken, commitments were not met, and these are just consequences.

You have to talk about this, because on an international scale greater morality is required as far as all these commitments are concerned. If we fail to do this, then there will continue to exist temptations to break or to depart from great agreements. [passage omitted]

Walesa Says Partnership for Peace Unsatisfactory

WS1201102994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by M.W.: "Imposed Partnership"]

[Text] "The Partnership for Peace" program thrust upon Poland does not satisfy it," declared President Walesa on the eve of his meetings with U.S. President Bill Clinton and the leaders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Prague on 12 January.

Asked if Poland seeks full membership in NATO or only its security guarantees, the president said that "paper guarantees" are good for nothing. An authentic security guarantee would be Poland's integration into European structures, including NATO. Walesa thinks that his meeting with the U.S. President will be "difficult" because Clinton will probably defend his program, which is kind of imposed on us.

President Walesa will fly to Prague at 0615 GMT on 12 January, while Prime Minister Pawlak departs 45 minutes before the president. That same day in the evening, also separately, both politicians will return to Warsaw. According to the Belvedere and the URM [Council of Ministers Administration], the top state officials cannot travel together. The president and prime minister will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, who is already in Prague to prepare the meeting with Clinton and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Polish delegation will first meet with Czech officials, and then with the Americans.

During his meeting with Edward Moskal, chairman of the Congress of Polish Americans, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak thanked him for the support extended by that organization for Poland's seeking full NATO membership.

Olechowski Optimistic About Admission to NATO

WS1101151594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Malgorzata Subotic: "Too Small a Step in the Right Direction"]

[Text] President Lech Walesa and the Pawlak government see eye to eye on statements by President Clinton

in Brussels: "This is too small a step in the right direction." No one has ever questioned Walesa's visit to the summit in Prague. Poland will never seek any other defense unions, including bilateral ones. This information was conveyed to journalists by Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski following the Cabinet of Ministers meeting on 10 January, attended by Walesa and legislators responsible for foreign policy issues. The president left the government building without making any comments to the press.

The Council of Ministers instructed the prime minister to accept the "Partnership for Peace" initiative; however, the final decision will not be adopted until all relevant documents are made public. The ministers of defense and foreign affairs will conduct a thorough analysis of those documents. In the opinion of Andrzej Olechowski, the Polish Government described Clinton's recent statements, including the affirmation of U.S. presence in Europe, NATO openness for new members (as a result of evolution), "Partnership for Peace," and the definition of new relations between the West European Union and NATO, as too small a step in the right direction. Walesa said that "if you make too small a step over the creek, you might fall into it."

Polish politicians believe that Western proposals for admitting new members to NATO lack a timetable and conditions for admission. At the same time, they emphasize that Poland's strategic goal is NATO membership. Minister Olechowski said that it is better to be in the waiting room than to wait outside. While the doors to NATO have been closed until recently, the minister thinks that we have now found ourselves in the waiting room. Meeting with journalists, Olechowski equated the situation to "engagement with a girl who agreed yesterday to marry us" but didn't say when. He also disagreed with journalists who said Poland stands no chance of being admitted to the bloc.

Asked about the Visegrad Group summit beginning today in Prague, the minister stressed that the stance of its members on the NATO issue is almost identical. "The differences can be compared to those between synonymous words." The Polish minister is optimistic about the readiness of our country to participate in NATO: "In terms of democracy and the development of the military industry, Poland is by no means worse off than Greece was at the time of its admission to the bloc. We should be among the first countries to be admitted."

Kwasniewski Explains Attitude Toward Visegrad

AU1201075494 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 6 Jan 94 pp 1,9

[Interview with Polish Union of the Democratic Left Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski by Pavol Minarik in Warsaw; date not given: "Can the Left Establish Capitalism?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Minarik] What is your view on cooperation among the Visegrad Four countries?

[Kwasniewski] I am convinced that mutual cooperation will not weaken our countries, but will enhance their domestic and international status. Therefore, I do not consider the course of action being followed by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, who is trying to incorporate Bohemia into a united Europe behind the backs of the Visegrad Group, to be a very fortunate one. I think our position will be better if we proceed together. A race to see who will be first, for example, in the European Union, will not speed up this incorporation process, rather it will slow it down. Apart from this, I think it would be beneficial to intensify economic cooperation in the region, for example, by establishing free trade zones or by adopting a joint course of action to acquire or restore markets, first and foremost, in the East.

[Minarik] Developing a security system in Central Europe should also be one of the main areas of cooperation among the Visegrad Four.

[Kwasniewski] I am absolutely in favor of us coordinating our steps for entry into security structures, including NATO, because we all face the same problems. First and foremost, we have to convince the West to open up to us, but, on the other hand, we cannot turn our relations with Russia and Ukraine into antagonistic ones.

[Minarik] Are you worried by the victory of [Liberal Democratic Party] V. Zhirinovskiy in the Russian elections, especially by his controversial statements about Poland?

[Kwasniewski] Zhirinovskiy's victory was remarkable, but the question still is what kind of influence will he have in Russia. The fundamental issue is how will the man who wields real power in the country behave, that is, Boris Yeltsin, who is responsible for the new constitution. It is crucial whether he embarks upon a policy of strengthening the democratic processes and becoming involved in security systems or whether Zhirinovskiy will scare him and he embarks upon a policy of nationalism and restoring power-wielding whims. I think, however, that Boris Yeltsin realizes that Russia needs to cooperate with the West and Europe and that he will also direct his steps toward this end. [passage omitted]

Budget Problems in Partnership for Peace Aired

LD1101213194 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Report by correspondent Slawomir Matczak, including recorded remarks by Marek Borowski, deputy prime minister and finance minister; from the "Panorama" program—relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Text] [Matczak] The Ministry of Finance has not envisaged expenditures connected with the Partnership for Peace program in the budget that has been prepared.

[Borowski] So the question of whether we could afford it has to be examined closely, and I think that the minister

of national defense should have his say too, or maybe first of all, as he has a particular budget at his disposal.

[Matczak] All expenses for possible joint military operations will be borne by the Ministry of National Defense. The Ministry of Finance counts, however, on financial support by western partners for peace as Poland recently suffered considerable losses, especially in the arms industry. This was connected with the collapse of the eastern market and with UN embargo. The partnership can become an important step not in military cooperation alone.

[Borowski] As the partnership does not give certain political guarantees, it may bring some economic benefits.

President Clinton To Visit in July

LD1201113494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1108 GMT 12 Jun 94

[Text] Prague, 12 Jan—Bill Clinton will pay a visit to Poland in July. During a meeting today, President Lech Walesa invited the U.S. President and, as PAP journalists heard from well-informed sources, the invitation has been accepted. The visit will probably take place in July during a European trip by the U.S. President, who will take part in a meeting of the leaders of the G7 nations.

Sejm Deputies May Vote Against Draft Budget

LD0801213694 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 8 Jan 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Excerpts] The Sejm debate on the government draft budget has revealed that both in the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and in the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] there are groups of deputies critical of actions being taken by Waldemar Pawlak's cabinet. If the commissions do not propose increased expenditure on agriculture and social welfare, 30 to 40 coalition deputies are prepared to vote against the budget. The coalition has, however, such a majority in the parliament that even a loss of a double this number of votes cannot undermine the government.

[Correspondent] The most dissatisfied are some National Trade Union Alliance [OPZZ] deputies, whose leader in the SLD parliamentary floor group is Stanislaw Wisniewski. Deputy Wisniewski is of the opinion that, if during work on the budget it is not possible to increase funding for social welfare, active combatting of unemployment, and restructuring of the most threatened regions, the OPZZ should vote against the budget. [passage omitted]

In the PSL, a group of about 20 deputies from the [organization of] agricultural circles is the most critical of the draft budget. The board [of the organization] instructed its parliamentarians to vote against the government if the funding for agriculture is not increased from 2 billion to 6 billion zlotys. Some PSL activists are of the opinion that the SLD coalition members want to discriminate against agriculture. [passage omitted]

Official Supplies Data on Russian Army Moves

LD1001221394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2051 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Jan (PAP)—Two hundred and forty-nine railway transit journeys of Russian Federation troops (3,627 cars) passed through Poland from Germany (?to Russia in the fourth quarter) of last year. This accounted for 71 percent of all transport planned for that period, according to Major General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, the Polish Republic Government plenipotentiary for the stationing of Russian Federation troops in Poland. Transport operations were also carried out by air: During the same period 198 aircraft flew from Germany to Russia and 281 from Russia to Germany. The Russian military mission submitted reports on 83 railway transit journeys for January. During the Russian troops' transit operations no incidents, accidents or "other events interfering with the transit process or public order" were noted, the plenipotentiary's statement notes.

Minister Kaczmarek on Privatization's Goals

WS1001103694 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Interview with the Polish Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek by Aleksander Geryn on the "Balance—Governmental Magazine" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Geryn] Your colleagues from the Council of Ministers are counting very much on this revenue from privatization. They think that with this revenue, they will be able to close some gaps in the budget.

[Kaczmarek] I think that generally speaking, this is one of the dilemmas of privatization in Poland: To what extent the mechanism of selling state-owned property—and I would like to stress that I think state-owned property can only be sold once since we do not plan on nationalization—is supposed to constitute a mechanism of a kind of safety cushion for public finance problems. Poland is undergoing some quite significant and major reforms and they are accompanied by disturbances in some sectors of public finances under some of my minister colleagues, so on the one hand they are critical of privatization, but on the other hand they expect precisely their expenditures to be financed by revenue from privatization. That of course reminds me of the philosophy of applying a band-aid to some of the wounds in the budget, whereas I am more interested in revenue from privatization serving the purpose of restructuring companies or branches that the state may regard as strategic, within its industrial or economic policy, so we would not eat our own tail.

[Geryn] Up to now, privatization has been and still continues to be criticized. Some even say outrightly that the concept is an implementation of a liberal dogma and that since half of our economy has been privatized, these processes should be slowed down a bit. Do you think that Poland can currently afford to slow down the rate of privatization?

[Kaczmarek] This will always continue to be a dilemma and I think the Sejm debate which is ahead of us concerning the directions of privatization will be a debate where I hope some—and I will encourage them to do so—will speak about what needs to be done in the future, whereas some others will stubbornly stick to the past from which I personally would like to draw conclusions. I think there will also be some disappointments in this regard, either by various reviewers or by sensation-seekers, in the sense that there can be no radical change in the directions of privatization, and the simple reason for that is that we are just learning ownership transformations, that is privatization. What goal should privatization serve in Poland? Should it be financing the budget deficit, improving the efficiency of the Polish economy, extending ownership rights to large parts of society, or should it serve primarily to exclusively concentrate those mechanisms which serve to improve the economic efficiency, to increase competitiveness, and consequently to increase prosperity? One should also keep in mind another issue: Ownership transformations should not only be understood to mean a transfer of state-owned property to the private sector, but also as a process of creating the right conditions for the functioning of the private sector from the very beginning, from scratch. And as I have also recently been saying repeatedly, privatization is also a system and a process of transferring power, and that is certainly the reason it generates so many conflicts.

[Geryn] Mr. Minister, forgive me this analogy but if I were to close my eyes now while listening to you, I would have a feeling of listening not to Minister Kaczmarek but to [former Ownership Transformations] Minister Lewandowski.

[Kaczmarek] It is hard to describe some economic processes using words other than these since these processes are simply constant and always the same. All we can do is draw some conclusions from the past and I think one could probably compile quite a long list of such conclusions with regard to which there would have to be changes in the current draft. As the government, we intend to present in the draft some material to the Sejm where emphases will be placed in different ways, with regard to Polish privatization, with particular emphasis continuing to be placed on developing the capital market, increasing competitiveness, as well as on preference being primarily given to restructuring, followed by the selling of companies, and on improving the access of employee partnerships to small companies, including performing the role of owner. But there is immediately another dilemma here: Can Poland as a state administration currently afford to manage 6,000 state-owned enterprises? I think the answer is no.

[Geryn] Will we finally see a law on reprivatization this year? The issue has been dragging on for four years now. Everybody knows that there can be no progress in privatization without reprivatization.

[Kaczmarek] The issue is included on the list of priorities when it comes to the directions of privatization for 1994. We have to approach the issue of the scale of reprivatization from a perspective of two issues, if I could phrase it this way: The first one is the state's financial capabilities—which means it cannot be a process which would lead to a weakening of the state budget whose condition is quite weak anyway; and the other one is that we will also be guided by the principle that up to now a law was in force—it could have been a bad law but it was still a law—and so we will implement reprivatization in cases where somebody's property was nationalized illegally, without paying compensation, and so on and so forth. We will try to observe these principles, or at least such is the conclusion drawn from initial debates during sessions of the Council of Ministers.

Union Leader Criticizes Government Inaction

PM0601201594 Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish 29 Dec 93 p 5

[Interview with Ewa Spychalska, National Trade Union Accord (OPZZ) chairperson, by correspondent Teresa Kwasniewska; place and date not given]

[Text] [Kwasniewska] Rumor has it that the government is currently lagging behind the National Trade Union Accord [OPZZ]—at least that is what Prime Minister Pawlak has alleged....

[Spychalska] We can no longer hold back and wait for the government. There are certain issues which need to be sorted out now, without delay. We all know that the situation is difficult; the previous government did not conceal that, either. After all, as we prepared for the projected economic transformations, we were all hoping (along with representatives of the state's executive powers) that that state of affairs could be reversed reasonably quickly. However, there still have been no proposal to set up a group of competent people to analyze what should be changed and how it should be done. Meanwhile, people are getting impatient and disappointed. After all, this is not what they chose the new authorities for—but no obvious changes are forthcoming, and it does not look as if they were forthcoming in any foreseeable future.

[Kwasniewska] But you seem to have little power or influence to change the course of events, do you not? After all, price rises are being introduced regardless of whether you approve of them or not.

[Spychalska] Some price rises are the effect of the last budget, and that was drafted and approved by the old Sejm. Others are the consequence of the switch to the free market economy. After all, no one wants or expects to see a return to the old system of central steering of the economy.

[Kwasniewska] What about the social contract which you were proposing?

[Spychalska] That concept was announced by Premier Pawlak, but to date the government has not come up with any proposals for such a social contract. That is why we are suggesting our own theses and proposals.

[Kwasniewska] Has there been much interest in your proposals on the government's part?

[Spychalska] The government showed so much interest in them that we were forced to make our proposals available to it while they were still being drafted and perfected by the relevant working party. That was because it turned out that the government had no specific concept of how to work out such a contract in the first place....

[Kwasniewska] What elements should be included in the social contract you have in mind?

[Spychalska] Generally speaking, such a contract should map out the principles of our social and economic policy that should see us through the next four years. It should also give a more detailed outline of that policy for the approaching year. Even more specifically, it should include proposals on how to galvanize the economy, which directions of foreign economic cooperation should be adopted, how to create opportunities for expanding the market, and which products to concentrate on. Also, how to halt the spread of unemployment, and how to find the best methods to create new jobs. The social contract should specify the extent of proposed investment outlays, the principles of our policy regarding state enterprises, and also the principles of our proposed pay and price policies. It is high time to begin talking about bringing our wages and our incomes into line with the free market rules. The abolition of the enterprises tax on above-normative pay ["popiwek"] does not solve any problems here. To date, there have been no talks with the government on the question of the value of labor in the finished product. And such talks should definitely take place soon.

[Kwasniewska] When do you think is such a social contract most likely to be signed?

[Spychalska] It would only make sense to sign it before the state budget is approved. That in turn should be ready for submission to a Sejm debate by the end of March or beginning of April. Thus, there is still plenty of time to negotiate its terms in talks with the government.

[Kwasniewska] But do you not preclude the possibility of testing the government's—your own government's—strength in a confrontation of forces?

[Spychalska] Regardless of whether or not there are own trade union representatives in the government, the government is a social consensus government, since it was appointed as a result of a democratic election. Apart from that, the government will always be just a side to negotiate with as far as the trade unions are concerned. And it is certain that we will often stand up against this government.

[Kwasniewska] The needs of the population increasingly exceed the government's ability to meet them....

[Spychalska] We know about that. However, it is the government's brief to expand its ability to meet the needs of the population. It is high time indeed for the government to activate the mechanisms which can increase state budget revenues and not merely go on curtailing budget expenditure.

[Kwasniewska] Will Solidarity take part in your negotiations with the government?

[Spychalska] We have had no response to the public invitation which we extended to Solidarity to engage in joint work with us. However, we will yet again approach our colleagues from other trade unions. After all, the stronger and better represented the union side, the better guarantees we will have to obtain some satisfactory results—such as the decent minimum wages in the "Social Welfare Guarantees Charter."

[Kwasniewska] The "popiwek" tax is scheduled to be abolished on 31 March, but the men at the helm of our economy are still nursing many anxieties about it....

[Spychalska] Their fears are unjustified. As a result of restructuring, today many enterprises are able to reduce employment in the interest of paying higher wages to their remaining work force, who are thus more efficiently employed. However, they often give up this chance during the transition period, in the situation where the government is unable to guarantee work for everyone. They keep many of their employees on, thus giving them a chance to continue earning money and avert the specter of becoming dependent on unemployment benefit. Such gestures are very noble. But this state of affairs cannot last very long.

Nor does the government have to worry that the entire profit will be absorbed by the wages. Today every employed person knows that unless a proportion of the company profit is invested in development and modernization, there will be no job for him—or for anyone else in the company—to count on in the long run.

[Kwasniewska] Will the OPZZ not encourage people to strike?

[Spychalska] If we manage to negotiate an agreement with the government that will offer us sufficient hope that the situation will improve, we will obviously be obliged to promote attitudes of calm among the population, to talk to people, and to persuade them that it is well worth remaining patient. If the public has even the

slightest evidence of some tangible improvement in their situation, we can ask them for still more patience. On the other hand, I see no chance of calming the public if nothing is seen to be improving....

ΩDrug Smuggling Through Poland

94P20199A

[Editorial Report] "Poland is becoming the best place for distributing narcotics to West Europe, a money-laundering station, and an area for hiding narcotic wares," reports the 19 December issue of the Poznan weekly WPROST. Adam Szyszko, chief of the Second Department of the National Interpol Bureau, told the Poznan weekly that since the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, which was the "traditional country that acted as a transit point for drugs to West Europe, the 'Polish idea' has attracted drug gangs." Interpol is said to believe that the equivalent of millions of dollars of narcotics-tainted money is in Polish banks.

Since 1990, Poland has become a "transit port" for narcotics. WPROST says that Colombian cocaine and West African hashish and marijuana make their way to either the ports of Szczecin and Gdynia or to Warsaw's Okecie airport, from which they are shipped to France, Germany, and Great Britain. Figures on customs seizures indicate that Okecie airport is being used more often than it had been in the past. On 1 December, for example, the Polish Customs Service seized a half-ton of marijuana that had arrived on a KLM flight from Lagos, Nigeria, marked as fish. "Just the fact that the shipment was from Nigeria caused suspicion because we do not import fish from that region into Poland," said one official.

Interpol's Szyszko says that the couriers are often protected by diplomatic immunity, which "seriously complicates the situation." The ambassador of Costa Rica himself was caught at Okecie airport with 12 kg of heroin in his baggage.

One of the most ingenious plans was devised by German smugglers. As Mr. Szyszko describes it, large parcels of narcotics were to be sent to Poland, where they would be repackaged, receive new papers, and be sent on their way to Hamburg to cover up the sources of the drugs.

WPROST points out that the efforts of Polish Customs officials to suppress the drug trade are hampered by Polish law, which does not make mere possession and consumption of drugs a crime. New banking laws have been enacted to prevent the use of Polish banks for drug-money-laundering schemes, but there are still loopholes that permit such schemes to flourish.

Wprost states that the involvement of international organized crime has further complicated enforcement efforts. According to Szyszko, these groups are far better organized and technically skilled than are Polish criminal groups. According to another official, both the Italian Mafia and the Colombian Cali cartel are involved in drug smuggling through Poland, with the Cali cartel reportedly using Polish couriers to smuggle narcotics over the Polish-German border." WPROST reports that police consider the production and smuggling of amphetamines to be one of the most dangerous recent developments. In the first quarter of 1993, seven and a half tons of these synthetic drugs were confiscated. Szyszko says that foreign money, principally from the United States, is funding Polish amphetamine production.

The 28 December Warsaw daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY reports that special police units have been formed to fight organized crime. These units, which will be several-hundred-policemen strong and will be under the direction of a Bureau for Fighting Organized Crime, were scheduled to become operational on 1 January. The bureau's work will be classified at the top secret level. It already has 26 domestic and foreign groups operating on Polish territory as its targets. Departments of the bureau will be opened in Krakow, Katowice, Wroclaw, Szczecin, Lodz, Gdansk, Poznan, Lublin, Bialystok, Olsztyn, and Bydgoszcz.

Iliescu Hails NATO's 'Historic Decision'

AU1101153894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Romania's Presidency has faxed us President Iliescu's statement, which reads as follows:

The summit meeting of the NATO countries' heads of states and governments has taken a historic decision regarding the expansion of the Alliance toward the Central and Eastern part of Europe, through a gradually developing process whose first step is the Partnership for Peace program.

We hail this decision, which we consider an element that strengthens the security of our country, and of the other countries in this part of our continent, in the new circumstances brought about by the changes that have taken place after the elimination of totalitarian regimes in Central and East Europe.

Romania is vitally interested in the establishment of a viable system of security on our continent based on the institutions of European dimension that throughout history have proved their capacity to ensure peace and tranquility in Europe. We view the NATO as the major organization capable of ensuring the necessary framework for stability and security in Europe. Romania's relations and cooperation with the countries that are members of the NATO is based both on the historic tradition of Romanian civilization in the European region, as well as on the community of interests and engagements toward the values of democracy and the rule-of-law state that our society regained after the 1989 December revolution.

On this occasion, I also deem it necessary to reassert Romania's constant interest in becoming a NATO member, a goal also shared by all important political forces of our country and I declare that we accept the Partnership for Peace also as a preliminary stage in the integration process and a form of many-sided cooperation aimed at the gradual fulfillment of the requirements imposed by the statute of membership of the Alliance, reads the Romanian president's declaration.

The basic document established with a view to substantiating the Partnership for Peace has an outstanding importance and sanctions fundamental principles for the relations between partners, among them the engagement to consolidate the democratic processes, the abstention from the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, respect for existing borders, and the need to settle conflicts solely through peaceful means.

The statements also assess that immediate measures will be taken for the competent bodies to examine the documents of the Brussels summit, so that, in the shortest time possible, discussions can start with a view to signing the basic document and proceed to negotiations for concluding other documents that are required by participation in the Partnership for Peace.

In conclusion, the Romanian president's statement reads:

Romania is ready to assume all responsibility incumbent on it as a participant in the partnership and, in the future, in the Alliance, and it is determined to make a contribution to the joint efforts to ensure stability in the region and in Europe as a whole.

PDSR Agrees With MSZP on Reconciliation

AU1101162194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] faxed our editorial office the following communique:

The PDSR acknowledges with satisfaction the recent position taken by the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] regarding the need to reach a historical reconciliation between Hungry and its neighboring countries, including Romania.

No doubt, the communique reads, such a reconciliation, in our opinion, should be sanctioned through the conclusion, as soon as possible, of a basic treaty between the two countries, a treaty that would confirm the current borders and would include mutual engagements in accordance with international norms regarding the insurance of the rights of national minorities.

The PDSR believes that the national interests of Romania and Hungary require that the relations between the two countries should be freed from the bitter burden of the past, and the settlement of these relations should ensure security, territorial integrity, and the prosperity of the two neighboring nations, namely the Romanian and Hungarian nations.

The communique also notes that not only the lessons of history, but also the current requirements of the European system direct us toward this goal. The normalization and development of Romanian- Hungarian relations would speed up the process of integration of the two countries in the Euro-Atlantic structures and would facilitate the success of democratic transformations, of reform, and of the transition to market economy in our countries. The communique also mentions that, as a matter of fact, the draft plan for stability in Europe proposed by France and adopted by the Group of 12, sets the act of finding bilateral solutions, through negotiations to possible problems that still exist among them, as a condition for a future integration with complete rights of our countries in the European Union, the way it is also suggested by NATO's Partnership for Peace.

Therefore, the PDSR reaffirms its confidence that realistic forces in Romania and Hungry will succeed in bringing about the complete normalization and development of relations between them as soon as possible, including the conclusion of a basic treaty that will serve

the interests of the two neighboring people and the cause of security and peace, the communique sent to us by the PDSR reads in conclusion.

PUNR's Brahas To Head BUN Alliance

AU1101195194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Jan 94 p 4

[Article by Crina Nedelcu: "The President of the National Unity Bloc Is Cornel Brahas, Deputy of the Romanian National Unity Party"]

[Text] "In the first meeting of the National Unity Bloc [BUN] after its creation, both sides of the alliance [the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) and the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania (PDAR)] agreed that this body should be led in the next six months by the PUNR," PDAR President Mr. Victor Surdu said. "At the same meeting, we elected the BUN leadership: Cornel Brahas, PUNR, becomes the executive president and Constantin Carbunaru, PDAR, the vice president," he added.

Yesterday afternoon, a meeting was held at the PUNR headquarters in the Chamber of Deputies on the way in which PUNR will participate in the negotiations with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] on the future form of government. "Until now," Mr. Victor Surdu said, "PUNR had a mandate from us to negotiate with the PDSR on behalf of PDAR, too. At the next meeting with the ruling party, BUN will be present, that is the PDAR representatives, too."

Dumitru Popa Appointed Head of TV Company

AU1101183994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1500 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] A communique received from Romania's Government informs that, at an extraordinary session held today, Romania's Government approved—following a report presented by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu—the resignation request submitted by Mr. Paul Everac, director general of the Romanian Television, who had been appointed to that position by Governmental Decision No. 21/27 January 1993. In this respect, a new governmental decision was adopted, Governmental Decision No. 18, according to which Mr. Paul Everac is released from his position as of today. Until a law on the functioning of public radio and television services is passed, Mr. Dumitru Popa has been appointed to the position of general director of the Romanian Television. By another governmental decision, Mr. Dumitru Popa was released from his position as secretary of state, head of the Government's Public Information Department.

Serbs Dismiss 'Unworkable' NATO Warnings

AU1101154494 Paris AFP in English 1514 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 11 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs on Tuesday [11 January] dismissed NATO's latest warning that it might bomb Serb positions in Bosnia to break the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened areas as "unworkable" and a "storm in a teacup."

"We have been threatened for two years and these threats are unworkable," General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of staff of Bosnian Serb forces, told AFP. "Before bombing the Serbs, they would first have to distance them from Moslem positions," he said, stressing the close proximity of Moslem and Serb positions on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA meanwhile said as long as French peacekeeping forces are in Bosnia, "we can say with certainty that the French will not support any military intervention" against the Serbs. "These new NATO threats of bombing are a storm in a teacup," the agency said.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Brussels on Tuesday said the Alliance was ready to launch if necessary—under the authority of the UN Security Council—air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, notably to open up the airport in Tuzla in the northeast and to give tactical support to allow some 300 Canadians blocked for six months by Serbs in the eastern Moslem enclave of Srebrenica to be relieved. A NATO bombing would force the Serbs to "re-examine all concessions made to the Moslems," Bosnian Serb strongman Radovan Karadzic had said Monday [10 January]. The speaker of the Bosnian Serb self-proclaimed parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, meanwhile hailed NATO's decision to "give priority to the negotiating process" on Bosnia, without even bothering to comment on the new threats of bombing.

Though NATO has on earlier occasions threatened possible air strikes to free surrounded civilians, get through humanitarian aid or protect UN troops, the Alliance has never carried out the threats. On each occasion, Karadzic has reported that any foreign bombing in Bosnian would turn each UN soldier into a potential target for Serbian reprisal attacks. There was no immediate reaction from Belgrade Tuesday on the NATO warnings against its allies in Bosnia. But it was seen among Belgrade circles as new pressure on Serbs prior to the negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina due to resume on January 18 in Geneva with the Moslems, Serbs and Croats to try to reach agreement.

Bosnia May Boycott Western Goods

LD1201121694 Hilversum Radio Netherlands in English 1130 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] The Muslim-led Bosnian Government intends to ask friendly countries to boycott Western products if NATO does not decide to intervene militarily in Bosnia in the near future. The Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations, Muhamed Secirbegovic, announcing the planned boycott request on Dutch television, said it would go out mainly to Muslim countries. Mr. Secirbegovic said that the Bosnian Muslims feel betrayed by Western countries that make pledges but fail to translate them into action. The Bosnian ambassador said the international boycott must be directed against countries that obstruct military intervention.

Serb Deputies Opt for No Change in Platform

AU1101155294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] The session of the People's Assembly of the Srpska republic ended last night with a discussion behind closed doors on the peace negotiations in Geneva and Brussels. The deputies did not study possible corrections to the present platform as the political basis of the Serbian negotiating team. It was decided not to change anything in the essence of the political stands presently contained in the platform. The final decision regarding the platform will be made at the next assembly session in Bijeljina on 17 January, one day before the talks in Geneva.

UN Envoy Sums Up Visits to Pale, Sarajevo

AU1001195294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Text] Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN Secretary General to former Yugoslavia, paid a two-day visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which he met with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities as well as with the Serbian aggressor's side. Yasushi Akashi spoke in more detail about the results of these talks at a news conference that he held in Sarajevo this evening. Zoran Pirolic reports:

[Begin Pirolic recording] During a two-day visit in Sarajevo, Yasushi Akashi met with the representatives of our country's authorities, but also of the aggressor' side in Pale. His impression after these talks put forward in Sarajevo tonight is definitely interesting.

I was given assurances by both sides that they favor peace and unhindered movement of humanitarian convoys, Akashi said. This afternoon I was given firm assurances by Mr. Karadzic that his side will fully observe the free use of Sarajevo airport. He reiterated his devotion to the free movement of convoys, Mr. Akashi added. This UN representative said that he had heard from both sides—the Bosnian authorities and the aggressor's side—that they favor multiethnic and multicultural life although they differ a little in their views on the implementation of this. After these, definitely unusual assessments, the UN special envoy to former Yugoslavia was exposed to a real barrage of often very unpleasant questions.

First of all, he was asked whether he believed Karadzic's promises even though they had been made on numerous occasions before and as a matter of rule subsequently broken. According to Akashi, the entire problem lies in the line of command. Dr. Karadzic admitted to him that the resolutions and declarations had not been observed so far because of disobedient soldiers on the ground, but that the line of command would be strengthen and similar things would no longer recur.

Asked about the possibility of air strikes against the Serbian aggressor, Mr. Akashi was at first surprised and then asked what air strikes were. It seems that there is a great confusion between air strikes and what we, in the UN, call air support, Akashi said. The forces on the ground will resort to this sort of protection only in the case of self-defense, Akashi added.

Answering to a question whether the recent murderous shelling of Sarajevo, which lasted several days, was also one of the incidents by disobedient soldiers, Akashi replied that elements beyond control exist on all sides. He admitted that four UN Protection Force experts confirmed that Karadzic's Serbs had damaged the runway of Sarajevo airport, but added that he was given firm assurances that this side would not obstruct the flow of humanitarian aid.

Asked about the possibility of a military intervention in Bosnia, Akashi said that this was a highly serious issue and that the final decision on this will be passed by the UN Security Council. However, I hope that we will never reach the stage of passing a decision about a military intervention, he said.

Asked to explain what is a close air support and how does it differ from air strikes, Mr. Akashi said that the final decision about this action lies in the hands of the UN Secretary General and that it will be based on the assessments of the commanders of the peace troops on the ground. The blue berets had, on several occasions, drilled such an action, Akasi said, adding that he hoped that there would be no need for its application.

General Francis Briquemont, commander of the UN peace troops for Bosnia-Herzegovina, also attended the news conference. Asked whether he had proposed air strikes he replied: I have never uttered a word about air strikes or air support, never. I said in August what I thought about this. The air support was organized but I never demanded it. I am the only one who can demand air protection, but I have never done this. I am not upset by what is being said about this in New York, Paris, Brussels, and Geneva. I have enough problems in Bosnia, General Briquemont concluded. [end recording]

Koljevic Assesses Talks

AU1001195094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1546 GMT 10 Jan 94

[Interview with Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the republic of Srpska, by Slobodan Kovacevic in Pale on 10 January—live]

[Excerpts] [Kovacevic] We shall now be talking to Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serbian Republic. Like President Radovan Karadzic, he has had a strenuous day today, a day without a break.

Professor Koljevic, you did not even have time for a break. You are waiting to join the deputies in the assembly hall any minute now. We should clarify a couple of things first. We are interested in new details regarding the talks with the UN special envoy Akashi. We informed the listeners of Belgrade Radio in the main newscast that all problems, misunderstandings, all Muslims' tricks about his arrival in Sarajevo were clarified at the very beginning of the meeting.

[Koljevic] Yes, this moment is exceptionally dramatic, especially regarding foreign affairs. I think that it would not be an exaggeration to say that we are indeed dealing with war and peace, with the issue of war and peace. How important Mr. Akashi's visit is is evident from several details. He landed yesterday, not at Sarajevo airport, but at another place, because he was prevented. The airport runway was damaged by a Muslim shell. Despite this he came here. You see that he considered this very important. Second, he has assumed an extremely important role in relieving Mr. Stoltenberg of the burden of civilian matters in this sector of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third, he arrived in Pale today and brought us a very encouraging piece of news, namely that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is currently engaged in civilian administration to a significantly greater degree, at least in the Sarajevo region. Therefore, the military option is further and further away. It is increasingly more a matter of individual irresponsible politicians from, I would say, Europe. Regarding the United Nations, we were today given firm guarantees that there will be no military interference, military intervention without their permission, that they are not in favor of it at all, and that they expect a peace agreement.

Finally, he also brought us news from Bonn that the talks between [Bosnian President] Izetbegovic and [Croatian President] Tudjman continued, that they had a long dispute about central Bosnia last night, about the enclaves of Travnik, Vitez, and the Lasva valley, that these differences have probably been overcome today, and that some progress has been made in Bonn.

Regarding the Serbian side, we gave him guarantees that we are ready to sign peace, that we will adopt a platform on that today, that under certain conditions we are ready to place some communes of former Sarajevo, excluding Pale, under UN administration. Therefore, things are moving in a positive direction, although they do not look all that great in reality. As you know, there has been some heavy fighting, some strong attacks, especially on Grbavica in Sarajevo and fierce clashes in central Bosnia. [passage omitted]

[Kovacevic] Professor Koljevic, can you give us some other details. How successful were the talks that were conducted during the first visit by the new UN coordinator Akashi?

[Koljevic] Relatively speaking—everything is relative and can only be compared with what happened in the past—the talks were exceptionally successful. We received the news today from the Croatian media and from Bonn that there is a possibility of a Muslim-Croatian union being created. We are not opposed to this at all, because we consider this to be a democratic right of both the Croatian and the Muslim peoples. Of course, we retain the right for the Serbian people to democratically decide in what way they want to be linked with these two republics of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We here even considered a wider, more global approach. We considered offering to the European Union a possibility of creating a confederation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in which all individual regions that have separated themselves could freely and democratically chose the way they want to participate in an association or a confederation of Yugoslav states.

Therefore, everyone would be able to decide democratically whether he wants a monetary union, or only a customs union, whether he wants firm federal links. This would be a completely democratic solution in line with the current European trend of integration of certain regions and, of course, their free choice regarding their political sovereignty. [passage omitted]

[Kovacevic] As we said, in about half an hour you will join the deputies in the assembly hall to discuss the platform for the continuation of the Geneva talks. You resolutely said that if there is no real wish for peace, if the so-called Geneva peace remained here in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, nothing will come of Geneva.

[Koljevic] We think that we should decidedly demonstrate to Europe, which saw how much we favor peace, that we want peace, if such peace can be established. If peace cannot be established, we can no longer fool our own people. The Serbs will not agree to the further procrastination of a solution. The Serbs can decide to fight to the end, but would much prefer an end to the fighting. However, people are not prepared for a third alternative, as could have been seen in the assembly today.

I think that a platform will be adopted today, although it is difficult to predict things. I think that it will be peaceful and constructive. I think that demands set to us so far will also be discussed. I hope that under certain conditions the deputies will accept the postponement of the solution, that is, accept the UN protectorate in Sarajevo for two years at the most. Third, I think that a very important thing for us in the platform, after percentages, would be the make possible the exchange of quality for quantity, something we insisted on in the past. We think that other parties are also interested in it. Regarding other matters, it remains to be seen what will happen because the deputies will voting on them.

Army Official Comments on Conflicts With HVO

AU0801214094 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 28 Dec 93 pp 10-11

[Interview with Jovan Divjak, deputy chief of staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Franjo Bosnic in Sarajevo; date not given: "The World Will Not Bring Us Peace"]

[Text] *Once a lieutenant-colonel in the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and presently deputy chief of staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Jovan Divjak is often both praised and disputed in Sarajevo. He was even arrested in Konjic once, suspected of selling ammunition to the Serbs. Our brief meeting in Sarajevo was used for this interview, and we first asked him to comment on conflicts between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council].*

[Divjak] It was difficult for members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO to engage in a conflict, which is a result of political desires to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina that fit into the longing for Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. I have been in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and in the Supreme Headquarters from the very first day, and all the while, we have been trying to involve patriots in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its internationally recognized borders. Unfortunately, some estimated that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be divided on principles originating from Garasanin, on the Serbian side, and from World War II, on the Croatian side, not taking into consideration that all three nations have lived and will continue to live in these parts. It is true that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina became even more complex and that the attitude of Europe and the world toward it has changed since the conflict began between the extreme parts of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. These conflicts have escalated to the point where former friends and allies who were fighting the common aggressor together are now perpetrating massacres against each other, killing women, children, old people, and burning each other's homes. Unfortunately, politics determined some relations that do not suit the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aggressor from the east is best at this game, the aggressor which began all this—the fascist SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and parts of the former JNA with extremists from Serbia and Montenegro. Joint goals of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the beginning of the war are now distanced due to some territorial pretensions and divisions, due to the demand that a part of the territory be controlled by some kind of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian (Muslim) republic, which is definitely not a referendum wish of the majority of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those conflicts will continue for a while, for neither the Geneva talks nor any other negotiations under the pressure of Europe and the world can produce any results. Conflicts will stop only

when all three warring factions agree to sit together and have peace. That can happen in six months, in a year, or more, but conflicts will rage on until the world stops interfering.

[Bosnic] Tell us something about the Tuzla recipe for relations between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Divjak] This is not only the case in Tuzla; fortunately, it is also alive in the Bosnian Sava Basin region and, to some extent, in Sarajevo. It is a recipe of how one should live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives of the Croats and Muslims on this territory have convinced us that they can and will live together. There is yet another fact—a new-old initiative on the Bosnian nation is emerging. Many people spoke about the new national organization. That is not bad, but the Croats, Muslims, and the Serbs must not lose their national identity.

[Bosnic] As a soldier, what do you think about the Geneva talks?

[Divjak] This is an attempt to forcefully solve the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, former Yugoslavia, and the Balkans, and not according to the wishes of citizens and nations that have been living here for centuries, but according to the desire of the old lady Europe. Let me remind you that in February 1993, at the time when he was leaving his "throne," U.S. President Bush talked to Russian President Yeltsin about the division of interest spheres according to the Yalta agreement. Past relations in Europe, in the Balkans, and in former Yugoslavia mirror the relations between the United States and Russia. When Russia pulls, the United States pushes its allies and injects a couple of billion dollars into Russia. Even recently, the United States gave $2 billion to Russia. We know about the historic friendship of Russia and Serbia and that Serbia depends on Russia, and Russia is protecting the "endangered" Orthodox Church from Islam and Catholicism. History accepts the destruction of a nation, ethnic cleansing, and those who want integral Bosnia-Herzegovina—the Croats and the Muslims—will suffer. Ethnic cleansing in this war mostly affected the Muslims, but the Croats will not be spared either.

[Bosnic] Are you a Serb or an orthodox Bosnian?

[Divjak] I have always been a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have lived in Sarajevo for 28 years, and all the while, I feel that I am a citizen without losing my national identity. I have never accepted any nationalism and I never will. I am a citizen of Sarajevo, a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Bosnian and a Herzegovinian. I feel like most honest people in these parts, if you will. Bosnia is my only country; I have no other. The Croats, the Muslims, loyal Serbs, all those who live in it, have the same right to my country.

[Bosnic] Is there anything you would like to say to the Croatian public?

[Divjak] Since this interview will reach the public in Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which there are mostly Croats, I would like to clarify something. The Chetniks—the Serbian side—accused me of being a criminal of war and a traitor of the Serbs, while the Croats accused me of being a member of the JNA intelligence service, a communist, and a founding father of the Muslim army. In this war, I am fighting for the equality of the Croats, the Muslims, and those Serbs who fight in the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army and in the HVO. My intentions were never aimed toward any single nation in particular. Accusations that I advocated conflicts between the Croats and the Muslims are senseless; this is propaganda by those who are against integral Bosnia-Herzegovina in its borders. Even if it is divided under pressure, those who live here will arrange their relations as they have done for centuries. Present leaders of all three national parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be forgotten, but Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain.

Serbs Have 'Respectable' Antiaircraft Defense

AU1101220694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1605 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Interview with Slavoljub Susic, Belgrade radio military-political commentator, by Milorad Denda; place not given—live]

[Excerpt] [Denda] Let us now turn to our basic topic—the decisions of the NATO summit in Brussels, especially those decisions and announcements regarding the situation in Bosnia. We have asked Slavoljub Susic to comment on these decisions.

However, before saying anything, let us cite the Voice of America. VOA is claiming that some high-ranking U.S. officers expressed reserve toward possible air raids, despite the U.S. arsenal of accurately guided weapons and the probable lack of Serbian fighter aircraft that could intercept the allied bombers. The said officers, the radio says, assess that the Bosnian Serbs could easily hide heavy artillery weapons in woodlands or mountainous regions or transfer them to populated areas that pilots would hesitate to attack. One general compared this military action to that of searching for a needle in a haystack. Colleague Susic, these considerations in Washington are interesting, but one could say something about the respectable forces of the Srpska army when talking about antiaircraft defense.

[Susic] Well, yes. It sounds paradoxical, but it is a fact that during the last several years, particularly during the last year of President Bush's term of office and during the first year of President Clinton's term, it has been the politicians who have been more militant than the soldiers; it is the soldiers who warn about all the possible consequences of hasty decisions to set off into a military adventure, especially in the Balkans. I would also point out that the Srpska army possesses a respectable number of artillery-missile forces, which are not to be underestimated. After all, this is an army of a formed state

community in which, whether one cares to admit it or not, organs of civilian power and the army as an institution are already functioning.

Apart from tactical-technical measures of antiaircraft defense and protection that the Srpska army would undertake in the event of an air raid, such as the scattered disposition of units, the frequent transfer of forces, engineering security and protection measures, the discipline of fire [discplina vatre], and the like, the Srpska army possesses a number of respectable forces for antiaircraft defense. First, what is involved are massive antiaircraft artillery pieces, including the most modern antiaircraft guns of the Bofors type, of Swedish production. This weapon has a laser sight that enables a maximum precision of hitting targets in the air. It has a great fire concentration of several thousand rounds per minute. I would also like to stress that numbers [masovnost] of these weapons and the density of fire not only aim to down the enemy plane but also hamper it in performing its task.

Second are the portable missile launchers of the Strela type—Strela 1, Strela 2M, and the latest type of Strela. These launchers are held on a fighter's shoulder and can hit a target of up to 3.5 km on arrival and departure. These weapons are a special threat to fighter bombers, for whom the said altitude is the most suitable in order to successfully hit targets. Therefore, when attacking, planes would have to descend to this altitude and then they would find themselves within the range of these missiles.

Of course, the next significant missile system is the KUB, which has a high maneuvering capability. It consists of three launchers mounted on one vehicle. It is used to hit targets at medium and high altitudes. These systems protect a territory and a disposition of units over a large area of land.

Finally, one of the significant systems of antiaircraft defense that the Srpska army possesses is the stationary missile system (Volhov). These are the largest and most powerful antiaircraft missiles that the Srpska army possesses. The present model of this missile system has been considerably modernized with a built-in special control system. This was done several years ago in one of the factories that is still operating in the Serbian Republic. It efficiently hits combat aircraft at the altitude of as much as 30 km and flying at all speeds that modern combat aircraft can reach.

What is characteristic about this missile system (Volhov) is that apart from being able to hit aircraft at very low altitudes, they can also hit targets on the ground, which would be the weapons that [word indistinct] possesses.

Let me also point out that despite all the modern technology for discovering targets, even throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, that NATO pilots certainly possess—and they certainly possess information acquired with the help of the AWACS system and directly in the field, as well as with other electronic devices—they can hardly discover Serbian forces' targets for the already mentioned reasons, something that the U.S. generals have also warned about. Even when a target is found, one has to attain a direct hit in order to destroy that target, something that is hardly possible even under the ideal conditions of training. After all, let us take a look at experiences from the Gulf war, where a view of the terrain is considerably better and camouflage less possible, and still efficiency attained was only 15 percent of direct hits with all launched missiles and projectiles. [passage omitted]

Muslims Continue Attack on Vitez, Novi Travnik

LD1101190994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1816 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpt] The Muslim army today continued to attack the Vitez and Novi Travnik areas and a general alert was also sounded in Kiseljak. Heavy street fighting is still under way in the area of Buhine Kuce, on the eastern approaches to Vitez. The Muslim units, reinforced with new forces from Zenica, are still trying to regain the positions they lost yesterday and get access to the Vitez-Busovaca road.

The Muslim army continues to pound the center of Vitez, using mortars and heavy guns. Novi Travnik has also been shelled throughout the day, as have the surrounding areas held by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]heavily pounded from the Muslim howitzers and mortars are the town centernd the area of Rastovci. It has been reported from Novi Travnik that the HVO repelled a heavy infantry attack on Relej, a hill near the town. The Muslim forces suffered a major defeat and were forced to withdraw, with heavy losses. [passage omitted]

Croats Halt Vitez Offensive

LD1101151394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 11 Jan 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, January 11 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croat forces have repulsed a Moslem offensive on the area of Vitez in central Bosnia-Herzegovina and forced the Moslem troops to withdraw from the Busovaca-Vitez road, where the two sides on Monday engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, the Defence Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina said on Tuesday.

Bosnian Croat units (HVO) [Croatian Defense Council] stopped the Moslem advance on the Novi Travnik-Nova Bila road south of Vitez, the ministry said.

Over the past two days, eight people were killed and 35 civilians wounded in the region of Vitez. Another 35 people are missing and the Croat authorities believe that 14 Croat women have been taken prisoners.

Fighting continued unabated despite talks on Sunday and Monday between President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic in Bonn and efforts of Western leaders to reconcile the former allies in the war against the Serbs.

Over the past few days, Moslem forces were persistently opening fire from all weapons on Vitez, Novi Travnik, Novi Seher, Zepce and Zavidovici in central Bosnia, the strategically important region because most of former Yugoslavia's military industry is situated there.

Moslem-controlled Sarajevo Radio, however, claimed on Tuesday that HVO troops were shelling the old part of Vitez and using poisonous gases in attacks on Dubravica.

The situation in the area of Gornji Vakuf is more or less the same and the usual 500 shells again on Monday fell on the town and the nearby Moslem villages, said Sarajevo Radio.

Bosnian Serb Army sources said Moslem forces had continued persistent attacks on all Serb positions in the area of Doboj in northern Bosnia, where the re-grouping of Moslem troops for a possible attack on Brcko was also observed.

During the night, Moslem units in the region of the River Brka some eight kilometres south-west of Brcko received reinforcement from Tuzla and Zvornik, the sources said.

The arrival of fresh Moslem troops was accompanied by the re-grouping of those already on the spot as well as by intensive reconnaissance of Serb positions south of Brcko with the aim of preparing a new offensive and cutting off the Bosnian Serb Republic into two parts.

Muslim Reinforcements Arriving

LD1101130894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Dispatch by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpt] Apart from the latest attacks on Buhine Kuce area this morning, the fact that the Muslim Army is constantly bringing in reinforcements from Zenica also indicates that the Muslim Army plans to resume its offensive against Vitez in an attempt to cut the Lasva valley in two, before an agreement is reached [in Geneva], the Croatian Defense Council command in Vitez warned this morning.

A general alert was also sounded in Kiseljak [Croat enclave west of Sarajevo] at 1030 this morning. [passage omitted]

Over 70 Muslims Killed in Western Bosnia

LD1101151994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpt] After Izetbegovic's meeting with military representatives in Konjic, at which the order was given to seize the [Croat] areas in central Bosnia and areas in western Bosnia and areas in western Bosnia by the time of the resumption of the Geneva negotiations, the extremists of the Fifth Corps attempted to break through the defense lines in Pecigrad. The defenders pushed Izetbegovic's units back several kilometers, killing 73 extremists.

The villages of Mujcici and Trzacka Platnica were liberated on this occasion. [passage omitted]

Inter-Muslim Fighting Resumes in Cazin Krajina

LD1101132394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1224 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Bihac, 11 Jan (TANJUG)—Fierce inter-Muslim clashes resumed today in the Cazin Krajina along the entire demarcation line, local Muslim media reports.

According to the same sources, Fikret Abdic's forces have captured the villages of Trzac and Trzacke Rastele and members of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army have captured the village of Skokovi and a part of Pecigrad.

According to the Western Bosnian News Agency and Radio Velkaton, both based in Velika Kladusa, sporadic clashes are taking place near Cumluk and Todorovo and new movements of troops loyal to Alija Izetbegovic have been registered near Buzim and Podic. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Discusses Bonn Talks, Boban Role

LD1101231794 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1920 GMT 11 Jan 94

[News conference by President Franjo Tudjman with foreign and domestic correspondents in the Presidential palace in Zagreb on 11 January following his return from Bonn—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Good evening. Croatian Radio and Television. Mr. President, at the Croatian initiative, in Bonn, another proposal was made to normalize Muslim-Croat relations. The reply is expected in three days time. What are your expectations? What will happen despite all of this fighting in Bosnia?

[Tudjman] As you said, I initiated a new meeting—for two reasons. First, despite the fact that all the sides, therefore the Muslims too, undertook the obligation in Brussels to halt hostilities during the Christmas holidays—between 22 December and 15 January—the Muslim offensive in central Bosnia still continued and threatened not only the population of Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Kresevo, over 100,000 Croats, but it also posed the threat of an ecological catastrophe, since an explosives factory is situated in Vitez. Understandably, the Muslim forces wanted to take the factory and it was to be assumed that the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units would not allow the factory to fall into the hands of the Muslims. This could cause an ecological catastrophe, high casualties, and tens of thousands of new refugees. This was one of the reasons why exactly a week ago I proposed another meeting with Alija Izetbegovic to point out the possible catastrophic consequences for relations in the area, the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the future relations between the Croat and Muslim people.

The second reason was my intention to present once again Croatia's stands, the stands Croatia has been advocating since the very beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina about the need and necessity for the Croatian people to be interested in cooperation with the Muslims; likewise for the Muslims not only because of their survival but because of the fact that it would be linked to western civilization by relying on Croatia. To this effect in this proposition of ours, in the draft contractual agreement, we presented concrete proposals for cooperation within a union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or else if a parting of the ways takes place—something the Muslim leadership has already opted for, then we propose cooperation between a Bosnian-Muslim republic, i.e. state, and Croatia. This document in fact conveys the continuity of this Croatian policy.

[Modric] Sanja Modric, NOVI LIST. I would like to ask you—we read in VJESNIK today, it appears that Sarajevo radio has reported this, too—that in Bonn you offered, and of course, Izetbegovic rejected this, that in Bonn you offered, that it would be possible to build some port in Peljesac for the Muslims. As we know very little about this, would you explain it in more detail. What is at issue here?

[Tudjman] Since Mr. Izetbegovic reiterates his demand that Neum should be ceded to a Bosnian-Muslim republic, i.e. state, that it should be placed under full sovereignty, I explained again that from a Croatian point of view such a demand was unacceptable, that it would mean a breakup of Croatian territory and the Croatian people. It would pose a threat to southern Croatia, including Dubrovnik. This demand is in fact in line with something Serbia's policy has demanded for over a century. It wanted to conquer Dubrovnik in this war, too.

Consequently, I said that we could only agree to what we had agreed aboard Invincible, i.e. we offer the Muslims a free zone in Ploce. We make it possible for them to build their own port on the Neretva. In Neum only the construction of a tourist facility appears as a possibility, on Croatian territory under joint management.

During the two days of talks in Bonn I said that instead of Neum we could offer this solution: That we rent some tourist accommodation to the Muslims on the Peljesac peninsula, where they could then be linked with their, actually not their, but a free zone in Ploce. In that way it could be thought that we again showed goodwill to find a solution with the Muslims, despite their demand regarding Neum, which is unacceptable for us.

I also reminded not only the Muslim leadership but also the European participants in the talks that the truce agreements of Pozarevac and Sremski Karlovci, of 1699 and 1718 respectively, through which the Dubrovnik diplomats succeeded in getting the two buffer zones at Neum and Sutorina, did not give access to the sea to the Bosnia of that period, but that this was a buffer zone by the sea which had a role of separating the area under the Venetians from Dubrovnik.

Many of them at the talks in Bonn were surprised by this and, as you know, this solidified the viewpoint of serious people in Europe that Croatia cannot agree to giving any sovereignty to Bosnia over Neum, for that would threaten Croatia's strategic, national, and state interests.

[Correspondent] VJESNIK. Mr, President, did the Muslims perhaps offer us something in central Bosnia?

[Tudjman] They did. Their offer was that we should let them have central Bosnia or else their army will seize the whole central Bosnia, which was, according to the Vance-Owen plan on reorganizing Bosnia into provinces, provinces with the majority Croatian population, and also according to the current borders of the republics within the Bosnian union, envisaged to be a part of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

They are carrying out the offensive in today's central Bosnia in order to conquer these areas. I told them that the Serbs too agreed that Croatia should get 17.5 percent

of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory and that this is the absolute minimum the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia—for strategic reasons—can agree to, that it is out of the question that Croatia should cede this territory, because these areas have predominantly Croat population, because the Croats lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the Muslims, and because the Croats defended these areas first from the Serb aggression and are defending it now from the Muslim aggression.

Consequently, their demand, the Muslims' position is therefore totally incomprehensible, as they lay claim to this area, because of the demographic composition of the population as well as because of the fact that this would reduce the share of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna in the distribution of these republics within the present Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. in a future union. In this respect Mr. Izetbegovic put forward a very interesting proposition and a very understandable one from their point of view—that we should come up with a joint stand according to which the Bosnia-Muslim republic and the Croatian republic should be given 51 percent of territory and the Serbs, consequently, 49 percent.

Acceptable at first glance. They, however, wanted to conquer 2 or 3 percent, included in this percentage—51, precisely in central Bosnia which was earmarked for the Croat republic. I pointed out that we cannot accept this as there is no other area inhabited by Croatian population that might be included in the Croat republic in the course of dividing up, either within the framework of a union or in a total parting of the ways. Consequently, one can conclude that Mr.Izetbegovic and his leaders invested every effort to, first, conquer militarily and then, possibly, achieve agreement at the negotiating table so the Croatian side would give up these areas which, as I say, for historical, political and strategic reasons as well as because of the present democratic state of affairs are such that it is logical that they should belong to the Croat republic in the division.

As far as that meeting and our proposal are concerned, it should be pointed out that our proposal was focused on the need to cease all hostilities. For their part, the Muslims stress that they now have an army of 200,000 soldiers. Unfortunately, by far the largest part of that army is directed against Croatian areas, against the HVO. In reality, they are not engaged in combat with Serbian forces anywhere, apart from clashes and mutual artillery attacks around Sarajevo.

Therefore, the Muslim armed forces are directed against Croatian forces and Croatian areas. This is one of the reasons, along with the two reasons I mentioned earlier, for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

We also initiated a proposal on cooperation and friendship between the Croatian and Muslim peoples within the union; a proposal on cooperation and very close links, almost a confederal alliance between the Bosnian Muslim and the Croatian republics and their alliance with Croatia. As we were aware that the Muslim leadership had already opted for partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the end of the talks we presented our proposals on cooperation between the Bosnian Muslim state and the Croatian state after the breakup of the union, i.e., the present Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Current attempts to seize the Croatian areas [in Bosnia] prove that the Muslim leadership has chosen partition, i.e., creation of their Muslim state. After Mr. Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, and Komsic signed an agreement with me on 14 September providing for cooperation between the Bosnian Muslim and Croat republics, and their cooperation with Croatia, Mr. Izetbegovic signed an agreement with the Serbs granting the Bosnian Muslim republic UN membership in case of a breakup. This was in reality an agreement on partition.

Just before the NATO summit in Brussels the Muslim leadership sent a proposal according to which NATO would offer guarantees for the Bosnian Muslim state. In the proposal they call it the pluralist Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. the victim state. This means that they did not even raise the issue of entire Bosnia-Herzegovina but instead they brought up the issue about ways in which NATO would offer guarantees for the borders and the viability of such a state. Therefore it is obvious that the current leadership has opted to create a Muslim state.

I must admit that during the talks with us, Mr. Izetbegovic and the members of his delegation said that their prime objective was to preserve the union, but that clearly all possibilities had to be examined. But we did not spend much time on that problem, because the main problem was how to halt the hostilities and to explain that conquering central Bosnia, which is what the Muslim forces are trying to do, not only threatening tens and almost hundreds of thousands of the Croatian people, and creating streams of refugees [sentence incomplete as heard].

Therefore this poses the danger that any future cooperation between the Croatian and Muslim people, between the Croatian and Muslim states, will be made impossible.

Mr. Izetbegovic admitted in principle that the Muslims have to be interested in cooperation with Croatia. He described our proposals as exceptionally useful. He said it in the presence of the entire delegations, the cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia and high-ranking German diplomats. This was said in Germany and then after the talks, I heard, he said that the talks had not produced any results. He even said that our proposals were, as a whole, acceptable, and that they would be discussed in Sarajevo and he would personally use his influence for the proposals to be accepted by others in Sarajevo.

We agreed that they should reply to us in writing before the Geneva conference, which will be held on 15 January. Well, God willing, we will see.

[Novak] Hloverka Novak, DANAS. Mr. President, some say that this peace proposal of yours is the last offer by the Croatian side to the Muslims. If Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim leadership refuse your peace proposal, what will happen? Does this inevitably mean war, or new negotiations? What do you expect the international community's reaction to be like in the light of the Muslim leadership's attitude?

[Tudjman] Let us be sensible and say that in the politics, the same as in life, as long as there is politics, as long as there is life of a man or of a nation we cannot say that something is the last thing. Consequently, we are compelled to have talks until we find a solution. We will be ready to continue the talks.

But what you said is completely true, that in our proposal and our examination of the geographical settlement we have really reached the last straw and the Croatian side in this respect cannot yield. We said so. We can state with pleasure that all important international factors both in Europe and the world have recognized the truth that in these negotiations Croatia has been behaving very consistently in aspiring toward peace, that it has been ready to offer proposals which are acceptable for all three sides and in that sense the international factors likewise understood our resolve when it came to the points where there can be no yielding.

I could say that since my initiative, I think it was at the beginning, on 5 or 6 November, and in the course of both conferences within the European Union, first the Geneva conference organized by the European Union and then the Brussels conference, and this one with this new proposal, that all important international factors became completely convinced in the consistency of the Croatian policy, the benevolence of the Croatian policy; and that with that Croatia's international position as regards the final phase of the resolution of that crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been considerably strengthened.

[Correspsondent] Swiss radio. Mr. President, you said that the Muslims had decided in favor of a Muslim state, that the Bosnian government had decided in favor of a Muslim state. Could that in the end provoke Croatia to derecognize Bosnia-Herzegovina? If Croatia makes such a step, would that provoke the Croatian Army to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Tudjman] If the Muslim offensive and their efforts to create a Muslim state directly threatened the Croatian territories, including the border territories of Croatia, it is obvious that Croatia would have to protect its borders.

It is no secret that in Herceg-Bosna a considerable number of volunteers from Croatia has been involved in fighting. But these are volunteers who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who fought in the homeland war against the Serbian aggression in Croatia, and who went back there as volunteers to defend their homes, their land, first from the Serbian aggression and now from the Muslim aggression. As regards accusations that regular formations of the Croatian Army have been involved in fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I said that there were no regular formations of the Croatian Army there: These are volunteers who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina and those who are working abroad, in Europe and other countries, who keep contacting us wishing to join their ranks.

Consequently, the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are interested in protecting their home territory, securing its survival. I told Mr. Izetbegovic that the Croatian policy has been and is going to remain... [pauses] that we have even been ready to influence the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain within the Bosniak Muslim republic, as a considerable number of Muslims will remain within the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and that their human and national rights must be secured on the basis of reciprocity. These Croats in the Bosnian republic and the Muslims in the Croat republic, can be a bridge for overcoming animosity that has been created in this horrific war, and for restoring permanent cooperation and friendship in the future.

[Modric] Modric, YOMIURI SHIMBUN. Mr. President, the map the Croatian press revealed today is not exactly clear. At first glance it appears as if the whole of Kiseljak and its surrounds are missing. Is it true that this part is included in the Muslim republic? Thank you.

[Tudjman] This is precisely what reflects the Croatian side's willingness to contribute its share to a solution that would enable the Bosnian-Muslim republics to meet territorial conditions, too, for an independent life. In this demarcation, in opposition to the Muslims' general demand that they get all the areas of central Bosnia, meaning Travnik and Novi Travnik and Vitez and Busovaca and Kiseljak and Kresevo, in the course of talks we agreed to this with the Croats of Herceg-Bosna so they would remain within the framework of the Bosnian-Muslim republic, Kiseljak and Kresevo with their dominantly Croat populations, but that Busovaca, Vitez and Novi Travnik should by all means be included in Croatia [as heard].

Likewise, Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, too, which were inhabited by predominantly mainly Muslim populations. In this way one ends up with a map such as the one you have seen. It is compact in terms of Croatian territory. On the other hand with Kiseljak, because of the fact that Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf are to be included in the Croat republic, one gets compact territory linked to Croatia. On the other hand, by leaving Kiseljak and Kresevo to the Bosnian-Muslim republic they receive an area around Sarajevo which is in territorial terms capable of supporting the existence of their independent state. This is what I was speaking about, in this way preconditions would also be created for cooperation and friendship and an alliance, both economic and defensive, as we suggested between the Bosnian-Muslim state and the Croatian state at a later stage.

[Correspondent] DAILY TELEGRAPH, London. Could you try to explain to me Mr. Tudjman—from Croatia's point of view what kind of role is Mr. Boban playing in the light of these new negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina?. Do you fully and unreservedly support Mr. Boban as a legally elected representative of Croats in Bosnia?

[Tudjman] Mr. Boban became the leader of the Croat people in Herzeg-Bosna during the resistance struggle against the Serb aggressor. At that time I personally had neither known him nor had I heard of him, nor had probably the majority of the people from political leadership.

However, he was doubtlessly legitimately elected, as you said yourself, during the self-organized resistance struggle of the Croat people against the Serb and later also the Muslim aggression. He has played an exceptionally important role in the Croat people's resistance against the Serb and later Muslim aggression in central Bosnia. But there are people in the Muslim leadership, including Mr. Izetbegovic, and others too, who also spread these ideas abroad, They laid the blame for the Muslim-Croat conflict on Mr. Boban and also the responsibility for the failure of the Muslim-Croat talks. It was clear to me, personally, and to other people that this was not true. But even in this respect the Croatian side showed its readiness to do everything possible, to remove all, even fictitious, obstacles to an agreement, that is to create all preconditions to reach an agreement.

I must say here that Mr. Boban, as a great patriot, as a man who placed his personal resources at the service of the homeland and the people of Herceg-Bosna, has said that he is a soldier of his people and that he will accept any solution which is in the interest of the Croatian people. Mr. Boban has remained the president of what they call the community of Herceg-Bosna, but he is not taking part in further talks to prevent the Muslim side using the argument that they cannot talk to Boban. So, they are talking to other people now and have received in written form everything that can be offered to them.

I think that the Croatian side has thereby shown its unreserved willingness to do everything to create conditions to end hostilities and initiate cooperation and friendship with the Muslim people in the future.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that Mr. Boban is not going to take part in the talks in Geneva...

[Tudjman, interrupting] This is not important. It depends on the nature of the talks. As you already know, in addition to the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] leadership, Herceg-Bosna has got its government, it has its assembly, a presidential council has been set up, they have the entire leadership which will appoint their representatives. It is important to restore peace, to achieve a solution that is in the interest of both the Croat and Muslim nations.

I will tell you one more thing: When we proposed cooperation with the Muslims on such a broad basis, when we urged right from the outset that the Croats should take part in the referendum for an independent Bosnia, when we were the first to recognize [Bosnia] and send our ambassador to Sarajevo, then we bore in mind the interests of the Croatian people, the strategic interests of the Croatian state, but also the interests of the Muslim people and the interests of the Western world, because we knew that the Western world wanted the Muslims to rely on Croatia and be linked through Croatia with Western civilization.

Contrary to extremist views that have surfaced in this war, and statements that we have heard when they said they wished to destroy Croatia, and that it was wrong for the Muslims to have gone with the Croats rather than with the Serbs, contrary to these and such views we have been doing everything on our part to prevent some fundamentalist and extremist elements from turning Bosnia into a hotbed of terrorist attacks, to which the Croats have unfortunately been already exposed in the horrific massacre of the Croat people in Algiers; such incidents have been recorded elsewhere, in Europe also, in individual showdowns. Consequently, it is in the interest of the Croat people and the Western world that the Bosnian Muslims become a constituent part of Western civilization, which they can remain to be by relying on and being in an alliance with the Croatian people.

[Pesikar] Mate Pesikar, VECERNJI LIST. Mr. President, please tell us just a bit more about the territorial settlement. What is the destiny of Bosnian Posavina? Thank you.

[Tudjman] As you can see on this map, our demand has been and continues to be, that the largest part of Croat-populated territories in Bosnian Posavina be included into the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. In this respect I owe an explanation to our people.

We, the Croatian people, were not able to defend all those areas in [northern] Herceg-Bosna to the same extent that we were able to do so in southern Bosnia and in Herzegovina. The reason is simple: The Yugo-communist Army and then Serbia had such huge supremacy in tank forces, in overall military equipment, and manpower in that area, and they were so much interested in creating a corridor between eastern Bosnia and the Banja Luka area, that even if we had been allowed to deploy the Croatian Army there we would not have been able to prevent that. Those few volunteers whom we could send there were not able to prevent that. The population of Bosnian Posavina also offered resistance, but a large majority, I daresay even 80 percent of the Croatian population fled Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should be recalled that in the course of fighting in Bosnian Posavina the Yugo-communist army and then the Serbian army bombarded and pounded Croatian areas in Croatia—between Bosanski Brod and Zupanja, even further afield up to Pozega and Djakovo.

At the same time, I would like to remind you of the fact that on 12 July 1992, when signing an agreement with Mr. Izetbegovic, I put forward a proposal on a military alliance, by which the deployment of the Croatian Army formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been legalized. However, Mr. Izetbegovic would not accept such a military alliance then; we only reached a conclusion that the Croatian Army should cooperate with the Bosnian Muslim forces and the Croatian Defense Council in border areas. Therefore, Croatia was in a very delicate position all the time.

Therefore, our demand for Bosnian Posavina to belong to the Croat national corpus has been and has remained the same, but it depended on the developments and on the situation in the Armed Forces in the course of the war. The territorial settlement in Bosnian Posavina has not been finalized in the negotiations so far.

I personally proposed to all the people in Bosnian Posavina to defend their areas and to organize their demands, including the proclamation of a separate province. Objections that we have allegedly forgotten about Bosnian Posavina to the benefit of Herceg-Bosna are completely unfounded. Not for a moment, on the contrary. I can even say something that a part of the public probably knows, I personally said: If we, with our volunteer forces and the local population, cannot prevent the corridor that the Serbs have been attacking and wish to control, then we have to defend Bosanski Brod as it is a part of Slavonski Brod.

However, something happened there that is still being examined by commissions: Why was Bosanski Brod abandoned at one moment contrary to all orders and, in my opinion, not under the pressure of the balance of forces? Consequently, we have been doing everything to protect our interests in Bosnian Posavina.

[Correspondent] One more question Mr. President. What are your expectations from NATO, from their latest meeting. A while ago you said that Izetbegovic had sent certain proposals to NATO. Obviously, he is expecting their help. The possibility of air strikes has also been mentioned. Can you comment on that?

[Tudjman] Mr. Izetbegovic has sent a demand to NATO only to come to protect borders of his state. However, we can be pleased with conclusions. On my return journey today I briefly read them. I have heard of the draft, of the proposal [as received], but we can be pleased with the NATO conclusions for two reasons: For the first time a higher level of unity within Europe and the United States has been created regarding the need to act more resolutely in the sense of searching for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; second, it was said that NATO, and I think that President Clinton in his Brussels speech had a sentence: If you leave such a sentence in the declaration, then everything must be done for its implementation [as heard].

These conclusions say: NATO and the international community have to apply force both against those who are strangling Sarajevo, against those who are obstructing humanitarian convoys, and against those who are threatening other areas. This means, in other words, that air strikes could be used against all three sides if they obstruct what I have just mentioned.

We are welcome this. We believe that in the international community a demand is becoming ripe for all three sides to reach a final agreement, and also a standpoint that the humiliation of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] will not be tolerated, nor actions by those who, despite statements on cease-fire, are continuing with the destruction of Sarajevo. In this case this can also refer to Muslims if they continue with the offensive against Croatian areas, which will also refer to the Croats if they obstruct humanitarian convoys. I am not mentioning anything else because the Croats are not carrying out any offensive operations anywhere, they are only defending their areas. I have not seen the entire document, but at first sight, judging by these few things that I have seen, we can be pleased with the conclusions. Two more questions please.

[Todorovski] Ilinka Todorovski, Slovenia TV. I have a question on another topical issue. Mr. President, have you been informed about Slovenia's decision to suspend electricity supply to Croatia from the Krsko nuclear power plant due to Croatia's outstanding financial obligations? Can you comment on that?

[Tudjman] I have not been informed about it, and if Slovenia adopts such a decision I will consider it a very unfortunate decision, that does not contribute to the establishment of normal relations; there has been discontent among the Croatian public and views that Slovenia is abusing the situation in which Croatia has found itself. Slovenia is issuing demands not conducive to the establishment of good-neighborly relations between Croatia and Slovenia for which we have been ready and still are. We would like all relations between Croatia and Slovenia to be resolved in a satisfactory way, in the interest of both sides, not to the detriment of anyone, and want them to be in accordance with the best European examples.

If such a decision has been made I do not consider it being appropriate to such aspirations.

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. A while ago in your reply to a question you said that Croatia will persist on its peace proposals, but also that its proposal that was presented in Bonn was final. Croatian opposition parties said that if Croatia's peace efforts fail, if the Muslim leadership continues with the offensive against the Lasva River valley, that Croatia will have to refer to its obligations stemming from its constitution and protect the Croatian population using other means. How do you comment on this, and when will it happen if it had to happen?

[Tudjman] The Croatian state has also until today acted in accordance with its constitutional obligation, and as I have already said in my replies to your questions today, it permitted the deployment of volunteers [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] to protect Croatian areas. Croatian state policy has proved itself as very mature in the protection of Croatian interests and pursuant to this, we will adopt necessary decisions, according to given circumstances on the battlefield and on the international scene.

[Announcer] By this we are completing the news conference. Thank you very much and goodbye.

Serbia

Patriarch Denies Endorsing Macedonian Church

LD1101193294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Jan (TANJUG)—Serbian Patriarch Pavle has never said that the Macedonians have the right to their own church at any of the meetings between delegations of the Serbian Orthodox Church and representatives of the self-proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle's office said in a statement today. This was the reaction of the Belgrade Patriarchate to the claim by Archbishop Mihail, newly-elected head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which have recently been published in the media, that Patriarch Pavle said that "Macedonians are a people, they have their state, and they have the right to have their own church." [passage omitted]

Macedonia

PDP 'Hard Line' Forming 'Liquidation Groups'

AU1101183394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Jan 94 p 4

[Commentary by P.Dz.: "Are 'Liquidation Groups' Being Formed?"]

[Text] Within the framework of the Tetovo PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] branch, 55 out of the total number of 70 subbranches are asking for an urgent assembly of the branch. According to information from sources close to the Congress Preparatory Committee, these subbranches have submitted officially signed requests.

That can signify that the leader of the so-called PDP "hard line," Menduh Taci, is losing support in the most powerful branch of the party. An assembly of the branch is expected to take place this week and it is possible that Taci will not get enough votes to be president of the branch, member of the PDP Central Assembly, or delegate. Such an outcome could imply that Taci would not be able to participate in the PDP Congress scheduled for 15 January. It looks as if the field actions of the group of delegates and ministers have started producing results, and the group is winning over Taci and his adherents.

In Tetovo, like Gostivar, half of the subbranches are asking for the assembly, and that speaks much about the fact that the "hard line" is losing support in the Polog region, where Taci initially received great support.

However, will Taci and his group quietly accept losing their positions? Some political circles in Tetovo claim that it is possible that Taci will use force to try to stop the assembly and the congress. He gave a statement in that spirit to Radio Kumanovo. There are also rumors in Tetovo that so-called "groups for the liquidation" of outstanding PDP leaders are being formed. If this is true, it means that the PDP division is entering a new and very dangerous phase.

[Box, p 4]

The Holding of the Congress Wary

An early PDP Congress has been announced for 15 and 16 January in Tetovo, officially signed and sealed in Macedonia. On the occasion of the announcement, we visited the PDP headquarters in Macedonia in order to find out the details about the preparations and the agenda of the mentioned Congress. There, we met a number of PDP members, including Mahi Nesimi, who is in charge of the Information Service and a member of the Congress Preparatory Committee.

"The PDP Congress will be held in Tetovo when the necessary conditions are provided and when it is convened by the Congress Preparatory Committee," Mahi Nesimi told us. We did not get an answer to when the twice postponed news conference, announced by PDP President Nevzat Halili, will be held.

—J.B.

New Rail Links Envisaged With Bulgaria

AU1201080494 Skopje MIC in English 11 Jan 94

[Unattributed report: "Railroad Track Macedonia-Bulgaria"]

[Text] The railroad link up of Macedonia with Bulgaria is soon expected to be realized. In Macedonia, two lines, in the direction Kocani-Blagoevgrad (Bulgaria) or Kumanovo-Guesevo (Bulgaria), are envisaged. The route Kocani-Blagoevgrad foresees the construction of a new track long 145 km, and which will cost $430 million. The second route Kumanovo-Guesevo consists of a track long 46 km, at the cost of $120 million. The direction Kumanovo-Guesevo is given the advantage, in view of the costs and the quick realization. The public in Kocani is complaining about this and believes that the government is not well informed as to the advantages of this route, which would connect their own town with Bulgaria.

Kosovo

LDK Presidency Protests Serbian Border Tax

AU1201075094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 11 Jan 94

[Text] In a public communique, the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] Presidency condemns the application of a tax of 10 German marks [DM] to cross the border. The communique states that, starting 1 January 1994, another extraordinary obstacle was added. For every

exit, even to Macedonia, the Serbian authorities want travelers to pay a tax of DM10 per person and DM30 per vehicle. Another measure, completely contrary to the elementary rights of free circulation, was added to the infuriated regime of crossing the border. With this, the communication between Albanians of Kosova and Macedonia and those of diaspora were reduced to a minimum. Thus, a vital interest is infringed and the Albanian population is practically placed under an almost complete isolation in the eyes of the European powers and the international public.

The LDK presidency strongly protests all these limitations and asks that such measures be immediately abolished. The presidency hopes that its request will encounter understanding by the international public and will enjoy support in its demand for immediately invalidating all obstacles of free circulation, the communique says.

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